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Abstract. We study the automatic synthesis of fair non-repudiation protocols, a
class of fair exchange protocols, used for digital contract signing. First, we show
how to specify the objectives of the participating agents and the trusted third party
(TTP) as path formulas in LTL and prove that the satisfaction of these objectives
imply fairness; a property required of fair exchange protocols. We then show that
weak (co-operative) co-synthesis and classical (strictly competitive) co-synthesis fail,
whereas assume-guarantee synthesis (AGS) succeeds. We demonstrate the success of
assume-guarantee synthesis as follows: (a) any solution of assume-guarantee synthe-
sis is attack-free; no subset of participants can violate the objectives of the other
participants; (b) the Asokan-Shoup-Waidner (ASW) certified mail protocol that has
known vulnerabilities is not a solution of AGS; (c) the Kremer-Markowitch (KM)
non-repudiation protocol is a solution of AGS; and (d) AGS presents a new and sym-
metric fair non-repudiation protocol that is attack-free. To our knowledge this is the
first application of synthesis to fair non-repudiation protocols, and our results show
how synthesis can both automatically discover vulnerabilities in protocols and gener-
ate correct protocols. The solution to assume-guarantee synthesis can be computed
efficiently as the secure equilibrium solution of three-player graph games.
1 Introduction
Digital contract signing. The traditional paper-based contract signing mechanism in-
volves two participants with an intent to sign a piece of contractual text, that is typically in
front of them. In this case, either both of them agree and sign the contract or they do not.
The mechanism is “fair” to both participants in that it does not afford either participant an
unfair “advantage” over the other. In digital contract signing, ubiquitous in the internet era,
an originator sends her intent to sign a contractual text to a recipient . Over the course of
a set of messages, they then proceed to exchange their actual signatures on the contract. In
this case, it is in general difficult to ensure fairness as one of the two participants gains an
advantage over the other, during the course of the exchange. If the participants do not trust
each other, then neither wants to sign the contract first and the one that signs it first may
never get a reciprocal signature from the other participant. Moreover, as these contracts are
typically signed over asynchronous networks, the communication channels may provide no
guarantees on message delivery. The same situation arises in other related areas, such as fair
exchange and certified email.
Protocols for digital contract signing. Many protocols have been designed to facilitate
the exchange of digital signatures. The earliest exchange protocols were probabilistic. Partic-
ipants transmit successive bits of information, under the expectation that both participants
have similar computation power to detect dishonest behavior and stop participating in the
protocol. These protocols are impractical as the number of messages exchanged may be very
large, and both participants having similar computation power may not be realistic. Even
and Yacobi [12] first showed that no deterministic contract signing protocol can be realized
without the involvement of a third party arbitrator who is trusted by all participants. This
was formalized as an impossibility result in [21], where the authors show that fair exchange
is impossible without a trusted third party (TTP) for non-repudiation protocols. A simple
protocol with a TTP has a TTP collect all signatures and then distribute them to the par-
ticipants. But this is inefficient as it involves an online TTP to facilitate every exchange,
easily creating a bottleneck at the site of the TTP. This has lead to the development of
optimistic protocols , where two participants exchange their signatures without involving a
TTP, calling upon the TTP to adjudicate only when one of the two participants is dishonest.
These protocols are called fair non-repudiation protocols with offline TTP.
Fair non-repudiation protocols. A fair non-repudiation protocol is therefore a contract
signing protocol, falling under the category of fair exchange protocols, that ensures that
at the end of the exchange of signatures over a network, neither participant can deny hav-
ing participated in the protocol. A non-repudiation protocol, upon successful termination,
provides each participant evidence of commitment to a contract that cannot be repudiated
by the other participant. A non-repudiation of origin (NRO) provides the recipient in an
exchange, the ability to present to an adjudicator, evidence of the senders commitment to
a contract. A non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) provides the sender in an exchange, the
ability to present to an adjudicator, evidence of the recipient’s commitment to a contract.
An exchange protocol should satisfy the following informal requirements [19, 13]:
1. Fairness. The communication channels quality being fixed, at the end of the exchange
protocol run, either all involved parties obtain their expected items or none (even a part)
of the information to be exchanged with respect to the missing items is received.
2. Abuse-freeness. It is impossible for a single entity at any point in the protocol to be able
to prove to an outside party that she has the power to terminate (abort) or successfully
complete the protocol.
3. Timeliness. The communication channels quality being fixed, the parties always have
the ability to reach, in a finite amount of time, a point in the protocol where they can
stop the protocol while preserving fairness.
In addition to the above properties, a fair non-repudiation protocol is also expected
to satisfy the following requirements: (a) Viability. Independently of the communication
channels quality, there exists an execution of the protocol, where the exchange succeeds. (b)
Non-repudiability. It is impossible for a single entity, after the execution of the protocol, to
deny having participated in a part or the whole of the communication.
Existing protocols. Some of the existing protocols in this category are the Zhou-Gollmann
(ZG) protocol [33], the Asokan-Shoup-Waidner (ASW) protocol [4], the Garay-Jakobsson-
MacKenzie (GJM) protocol [13] and the Kremer-Markowitch (KM) protocol [20]. Non-
repudiation protocols are difficult to design in general [32, 28, 19, 14, 16] and much literature
covers the design and verification of these protocols. While some of the literature covers
the discovery of vulnerabilities in these protocols based on the content of the exchanged
messages, others have tried to find attacks based on the sequences of messages that can be
exchanged, based on the rules of the protocols. However, there is no work that focuses on
automatically obtaining correct solutions of these subtle and hard to design protocols.
Our contributions. We show that the classical synthesis formulations that are strictly
competitive are inadequate for synthesizing these protocols and that newer conditionally
competitive formulations are more appropriate. To our knowledge this is the first applica-
tion of game-theoretic controller synthesis to security protocols. Synthesis has many advan-
tages over model checking. While model checking finds specific vulnerabilities for a designed
protocol, the counter-examples in synthesis are strategies (or refinements) that exhibit vul-
nerabilities against a set of protocol realizations. Moreover, impossibility results such as
failure to realize non-repudiation protocols without a TTP cannot be deduced with model
checking, whereas such results can be deduced in a synthesis framework, as we show in this
paper. Our contributions are as follows:
1. We present the formal objectives of the participants and the trusted third party as path
formulas in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and prove that satisfaction of the objectives
imply fairness of the protocols (for syntax, semantics and a description of LTL see [23,
18]). The timeliness property is also satisfied easily. The precise formalization of protocol
requirements as LTL path formulas is a basic pre-requisite for synthesis.
2. We show that classical (strictly competitive) co-synthesis and weak (co-operative) co-
synthesis fail, whereas assume-guarantee (conditionally competitive) co-synthesis [9] suc-
ceeds.
3. We show that all solutions in the set PAGS of assume-guarantee solutions are attack-
free, i.e., any solution in PAGS prevents malicious participants from gaining an unfair
advantage.
4. We show that the ASW certified mail protocol is not in PAGS , due to known vulner-
abilities that could have been automatically discovered. The GJM protocol is also not
in PAGS as it compromises our objective for the TTP, while providing fairness and
abuse-freeness to the agents. The KM protocol is in PAGS and it follows that it could
have been automatically generated by formalizing the problem of protocol design as a
synthesis problem.
5. The ASW, GJM and the KM protocol are not symmetric as they do not allow the recip-
ient to abort the protocol. From our analysis of the refinements in PAGS we construct a
new and symmetric fair non-repudiation protocol that provides not just the originator
but also the recipient in an exchange, the ability to abort the protocol. Given that the
TTP satisfies certain constraints on her behavior, such that her objective is satisfied, we
show that the symmetric protocol is attack-free.
6. Our results provide a game-theoretic justification of the need for a trusted third party.
This gives an alternative justification of the impossibility results of [12, 21].
It was shown in [9] that the solutions of assume-guarantee synthesis can be obtained through
the solution of secure equilibria [10] in graph games. Applying the results of [9], given our
objectives, we show that for fair non-repudiation protocols, the solutions can be obtained in
quadratic time.
Related works. The formal verification of fair exchange protocols uses model checking
to verify a set of protocol objectives specified in a suitable temporal logic. The work of
Shmatikov and Mitchell [28] uses the finite state tool Murϕ to model the participants in a
protocol together with an intruder model, to check a set of safety properties by state space
exploration. They expose a number of vulnerabilities that may lead to replay attacks in both
the ASW protocol and the GJM protocol. Zhou et al., show the use of belief logics to verify
non-repudiation protocols [34]. The works [15, 14, 16, 7] use game theoretic models and the
logic ATL to formally specify fairness, abuse-freeness and timeliness, that they verify using
the tool MOCHA [2]. Independently, in [6] the authors use a game-based approach, with
a set-rewriting technique, to verify fair exchange protocols. However, these works focus on
verification and not on the synthesis of protocols. Armando et al., [3] use set-rewriting with
LTL to verify the ASW protocol and report a new attack on the protocol. Louridas in [17]
provides several insightful guidelines for the design of non-repudiation protocols.
The notion of weak or co-operative co-synthesis was introduced in [11], classical or strictly
competitive co-synthesis was studied in [24, 26] and assume-guarantee or conditionally com-
petitive co-synthesis was introduced in [9]. But none of these works consider security pro-
tocols. The first effort at synthesizing security protocols is [22, 29] and is related to the
automatic generation of mutual authentication protocols, where the authors use iterative
deepening with a cost function to generate correct protocols that minimize cost; they do not
address digital contract signing. In [27], the authors describe a prototype synthesis tool that
uses the BAN [5] logic to describe protocol goals with extensions to describe protocol rules
that, when combined with a proof system, can be used to generate protocols satisfying those
goals. The authors use their approach to synthesize the Needham-Schroeder protocol; they
do not address digital contract signing. The work of [1] uses multi-player games to obtain
correct solutions of multi-party rational exchange protocols in the emerging area of rational
cryptography. These protocols do not provide fairness, but do ensure that rational parties
would have no reason to deviate from the protocol. None of the above works use a condition-
ally competitive synthesis formulation, which we show is necessary for fair non-repudiation
protocols. Our technique is very different from these and all previous works, as we use the
rich body of research in controller synthesis to construct fair exchange protocols efficiently;
in time that is quadratic in the size of the model. The finite state models are typically small,
so that the application of synthesis techniques as we propose in this paper is both appealing
and realizable in practice.
2 Fair Non-repudiation Protocols
In this section we introduce fair non-repudiation protocols. We first define a participant
model, a protocol model and an attack model. We then introduce the agents and the trusted
third party that participate in fair exchange protocols, the messages that they may send
and receive, and the channels over which they communicate. Finally, we introduce a set of
predicates that are set based on messages that are sent and received and that form the basis
for our protocol and participant objectives in the subsequent section.
A participant model. Our protocol model is different from the Strand Space model [30]
and is closer to the model required for the synthesis of protocols as participant refinements.
We define our model as follows: Let V be a finite set of variables that take values in some
domain Dv. A valuation f over the variables V is a function f : V 7→ Dv that assigns to
each variable v ∈ V , a value f(v) ∈ Dv; we take F [V ] as the set of all valuations over the
variables in V . Let M be a finite set of messages (terms in the Strand Space model) that
are exchanged between a set A = {Ai | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} (roles in the Strand Space model) of
participants. We define each participant as the tuple Ai = (Li, Vi, Λi, δi), where Li is a finite
set of control points or values taken by a program counter, Vi ⊆ V is a set of variables,
Λi : F [Vi] 7→ 2M is a message assignment, that given a valuation f ∈ F [Vi], returns the set
of messages that can be sent by Ai at f ; this set includes all messages that can be composed
by Ai based on what she knows in the valuation f . Valuations over variables represent what
a participant knows at a given control point. We take V =
⋃n
i=0 Vi and assume that the sets
Vi form a partition of V . An Ai transition function is δi : Li × F [Vi] ×M 7→ Li × F [Vi],
that given a control point, a valuation over Vi and a message either sent or received by
Ai, returns the next control point of Ai and an updated valuation. The participants may
send messages simultaneously and independently, and can either receive a message or send
a message at every control point.
The most general participants. We interpret the elements of A as the most general
participants in an exchange; the participants in A can send any message that can be com-
posed at each control point, based on messages they have received up to that control point.
We take the interaction between the elements of A as the most general exchange program.
Every participant in an exchange has her own objective to satisfy. We take the objective of
a participant as a set of desired sequences of valuations of the protocol variables.
A protocol model. A realization of an exchange protocol is a restriction of the most
general exchange program that consists of the set A′ = {A′i | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} of participants,
with behaviors restricted by the rules of the protocol. We take A′i = (L
′
i, Vi, Λ
′
i, δ
′
i), where
L′i ⊆ Li; Vi is the same set of variables as in Ai; for every valuation f ∈ F [Vi] we have
Λ′i(f) ⊆ Λi(f); and δ
′
i : L
′
i×F [Vi]×M 7→ L
′
i×F [Vi] is the transition function, that given a
control point in L′i, a valuation over Vi and a message either sent or received by A
′
i returns
the next control point of A′i and an updated valuation. For l ∈ L
′
i, v ∈ F [Vi] and m ∈ M,
we have δ′i(l, v,m) = δi(l, v,m). We define a protocol instance (or a protocol run) as any
sequence of valuations generated by the participants in A′ and take the set of all possible
protocol runs as Runs(A′). We refer to a message that can be sent by a participant as a
move of that participant.
An attack model.We define an attack on a protocol as the behavior of a subset of protocol
participants such that the resulting sequence of messages is in their objective but not in the
objective of at least one of the other participants. Formally, let Y ⊆ A be a subset of the most
general participants with (A\Y )′ = {A′i|Ai ∈ (A\Y )} being the remaining participants that
follow the rules of the protocol. A protocol has a Y -attack if the most general participants
in Y can generate a message sequence, given (A \ Y )′ follow the protocol, that is not in the
objective of at least one participant in (A \ Y )′ but is in the objectives of all participants in
Y . A protocol is attack-free, if there exists no Y -attack for all Y ∈ 2A.
Agents. An agent in a two-party exchange protocol is one of the two participating entities
signing an online contract. Based on whether an agent proposes a contract or accepts a
contract originating from another agent, we get two roles that an agent can play; that of an
originator of a contract, designated by O or the recipient of a contract, designated by R.
Agents communicate with each other over channels.
Trusted third party (TTP). The trusted third party or TTP is a participant who is
trusted by the agents and adjudicates and resolves disputes. It is known that a fair exchange
protocol cannot be realized without the TTP [12, 21]. We model the TTP explicitly as a
participant, define her objective and using our formulation give a game-theoretic justification
that the TTP is necessary. Agents and the TTP communicate with each other over channels.
Messages. A message is an encrypted stream of bytes; we treat each message as an atomic
unit. We assume each message contains a nonce that uniquely identifies a protocol instance;
participants can simultaneously participate in multiple protocol instances. We are not con-
cerned with the exact contents of each message, but in what each message conveys; this is
in keeping with our objective of synthesizing protocols that are attack-free with respect to
message interleavings. From the definition of messages in fair exchange protocols in [15, 14,
16, 28] and other works, we define the set M of messages as follows:
– m1 is a message that may be sent by O to R. The intent of this message is to convey
O’s desire to sign a contract with a recipient R.
– m2 is a message that may be sent by R upon receiving m1 to O. This conveys R’s intent
to sign the contract sent by O.
– m3 is a message that may be sent by O to R upon receiving m2 and contains the actual
signature of O.
– m4 is a message that contains the actual signature of R and may be sent by R to O
upon receiving m3.
– aO1 is a message that may be sent by O to the TTP and conveys O’s desire to abort the
protocol.
– aO2 (resp. a
R
2 ) is a message that may be sent by the TTP to O (resp. R) that confirms
the abort by including an abort token for O (resp. R).
– rO1 (resp. r
R
1 ) is a message that may be sent by O (resp. R) to the TTP and conveys O’s
(resp. R’s) desire to get the TTP to resolve a protocol instance by explicitly requesting
the TTP to adjudicate. We do not specify the content of rO1 or r
R
1 but make the as-
sumption that the TTP needs m1 to recover the protocol for R and similarly needs m2
to recover the protocol for O.
– rO2 (resp. r
R
2 ) is a message that may be sent by the TTP to O (resp. R) and contains a
universally verifiable signature in lieu of the signature of R (resp. O).
The messages that each participant can send in a state depends on what the participant
knows in that state. We assume that every recipient can check if the message she receives
contains what she expects and that it originates from the purported sender. We impose
an order on the messages m1,m2,m3 and m4 as it can be shown trivially in our synthesis
formulation that O sending m3 before receiving m2 and R sending m4 before receiving
m3 violates their respective objectives. Further, since our concern in this paper is not to
synthesize messages impervious to attacks, but rather the correct sequences of messages
that are impervious to attacks, we assume the former can be accomplished by the use of
appropriate cryptographic primitives. We remark that primitives such as private contract
signatures (PCS) introduced by Garay et al., in [13], can be used with protocols that are
synthesized using our technique to ensure such properties as the designated verifier property
which guarantees abuse-freeness. In our formulations, we consider a reasonable TTP that
satisfies the following restrictions on behavior:
1. The TTP will never send a message unless it receives an abort or a resolve request.
2. The TTP processes messages in a first-in-first-out fashion.
3. If the first message received by the TTP is an abort request, then the TTP will eventually
send an abort token.
4. If the first message received by the TTP is a resolve request, then the TTP will eventually
send an agent signature.
Channels. A channel is used to deliver a message. There are three types of channels that are
typically modeled in the literature. We present them here in decreasing order of reliability:
1. An operational channel delivers all messages within a known, finite amount of time.
2. A resilient channel eventually delivers all messages, but there is no fixed finite bound
on the time to deliver a message.
3. An unreliable channel may not deliver all messages eventually.
We model the channels between the agents as unreliable and those between the agents and
the TTP as resilient as in prevailing models; messages sent to the TTP and by the TTP
will eventually be delivered. We do not model the channels explicitly, but synthesize pro-
tocols irrespective of channel behavior. In particular, unreliable channels may never deliver
messages and messages sent to the TTP may arrive in any order at the TTP.
Scheduler. The scheduler is not explicitly part of any fair exchange protocol. The protocol
needs to provide all agents the ability to send messages asynchronously. This implies that the
agents can choose their actions simultaneously and independently. We model this behavior
by using a fair scheduler that assigns each participant a turn and we synthesize refinements
against all possible behaviors of a fair scheduler.
Predicates. We introduce the following set of predicates.
– M1 is set by O, when she sends message m1 to R.
– EOO, referred to as the Evidence Of Origin, is set by R when either m1 or r
R
2 is received.
– EOR, referred to as the Evidence of Receipt , is set by O when eitherm2 or r
O
2 is received.
– EOOOk and EOO
TTP
k are referred to as O’s signature. EOO
O
k is set by R when R receives
m3 and EOO
TTP
k is set by R when he receives r
R
2 .
– EORRk and EOR
TTP
k are referred to as R’s signature. EOR
R
k is set by O when O receives
m4 and EOR
TTP
k is set by O when she receives r
O
2 .
– AO is set by O and indicates that aO2 has been received.
– AR is set by R and indicates that aR2 has been received.
– ABR is set by the TTP when an abort request, aO1 is received.
– RES is set by the TTP when a resolve request, rO1 or r
R
1 , is received.
All predicates are monotonic in that once they are set, they remain set for the duration of a
protocol instance [28]. We distinguish between a signature sent by an agent and the signature
sent by the TTP as a replacement for an agent’s signature in the predicates. Distinguishing
these signatures enables modeling TTP accountability [28]. The non-repudiation of origin for
R, denoted by NRO, means that R has received both O’s intent to sign a contract and O’s
signature on the contract so that O cannot deny having signed the contract to a third party.
Formally, NRO is defined as: NRO = EOO ∧ (EOOOk ∨ EOO
TTP
k ). The non-repudiation of
receipt for O, denoted by NRR, means that O has received both the intent and signature of
R on a contract so that R cannot deny having signed the contract to a third party. Formally,
NRR is defined as: NRR = EOR ∧ (EORRk ∨ EOR
TTP
k ).
3 LTL Specifications for Protocol Requirements
The synthesis of programs requires a formal objective of their requirements. One of our
contributions in this paper is to present a precise and formal description of the protocol
requirement as a path formula in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL [23, 18]), which then becomes
our synthesis objective. In this section, we define the objective for fair non-repudiation
protocols, objectives for the agents and the TTP and show that satisfaction of the objectives
of the agents and the TTP imply satisfaction of the objective of the protocols. We use LTL,
a logic that is used to specify properties of infinite paths in finite-state transition systems.
In our specifications, we use the usual LTL notations ✷ and ✸ to denote always (safety)
and eventually (reachability) specifications, respectively.
Fairness. Informally, fairness for O can be stated as “For all protocol instances if the non-
repudiation of origin (NRO) is ever true, then eventually the non-repudiation of receipt
(NRR) is also true” [16]. The fairness property for O is expressed by the LTL formula
ϕOf = ✷(NRO⇒ ✸NRR) .
Similarly, the fairness property for R is expressed by the LTL formula ϕRf = ✷(NRR ⇒
✸NRO). We say that a protocol is fair, if in all instances of the protocol, fairness for both
O and R holds. Hence the fairness requirement for the protocol is expressed by the formula
ϕf = ϕ
O
f ∧ ϕ
R
f . (1)
Abuse-freeness. The definition of abuse-freeness as given in [13], is the following: “An
optimistic contract signing protocol is abuse-free if it is impossible for a single player at
any point in the protocol to be able to prove to an outside party that he has the power
to terminate (abort) or successfully complete the contract”. In [8], the authors prove that
in any fair optimistic protocol, an optimistic participant yields an advantage to the other
participant. In a given protocol instance, once an agent has the other agent’s intent to sign
a contract, he can use this intent to negotiate a different contract with a third party, while
ensuring that the original protocol instance is aborted. The term aborted is used here to
mean that neither agent can get a non-repudiation evidence in a given protocol instance,
once that instance is aborted. As noted by the authors of [8], the best that one can hope for
is to prevent either participant from proving to a third party that he has an advantage, or in
other words, that he has the other participant’s intent to sign the contract. This is defined as
abuse-freeness . As noted by the authors of [13, 15], using PCS or Private Contract Signatures ,
introduced by Garay et al., in [13], which provides the designated verifier property, neither
agent can prove the other agent’s intent to sign the contract to anyone other than the TTP.
Therefore, ensuring abuse-freeness requires the use of PCS. Since PCS are requisite to ensure
abuse-freeness, we do not model abuse-freeness, or the stronger property balance [6], in our
formalism.
Timeliness. Informally, timeliness is defined as follows: “A protocol respects timeliness, if
both agents always have the ability to reach, in a finite amount of time, a point in the protocol
where they can stop the protocol while preserving fairness”. We do not model timeliness in
this paper as the cases in the literature where timeliness is compromised involve the lack of
an abort subprotocol. Since we explicitly include the capability to abort the protocol, our
solution provides timeliness as guaranteed by existing protocols. Alternatively, timeliness
could be explicitly modeled in the specifications of the agents and the TTP, but in the
interest of keeping the objectives simpler so that we convey the more interesting idea of
using assume-guarantee synthesis, we avoid modeling timeliness explicitly.
Signature exchange. A protocol is an exchange protocol if it enables the exchange of
signatures. This is also referred to as Viability in the literature. For an exchange protocol
to be a non-repudiation protocol, at the end of every run of the protocol, either the agents
have their respective non-repudiation evidences, or, if they do not have their non-repudiation
evidences, they have the abort token. The property that evidences once obtained are not
repudiable is referred to as Non-repudiability. A fair non-repudiation protocol must satisfy
fairness, abuse-freeness, non-repudiability and viability.
We now present intuitive objectives for the agents and the trusted third party and show
that satisfaction of these objectives implies that the protocols we synthesize are fair.
Specification for the originator O. The objective of the originator O is expressed as
follows:
– In all protocol instances, she eventually sends the evidence of origin. This is expressed
by the LTL formula ϕ1O = ✸M1.
– In all protocol instances, one of the following statements should be true:
1. (a) The originator eventually gets the recipient’s signature EORRk or, (b) she even-
tually gets the recipient’s signature EORTTPk and never gets the abort token AO.
This is expressed by the LTL formula
ϕ2O = (✸EOR
R
k ∨ (✸EOR
TTP
k ∧✷¬AO)) .
2. (a) The originator eventually gets the abort token and, (b) the recipient never gets
her signature EOOOk and never gets her signature EOO
TTP
k from the TTP. This is
expressed by the LTL formula
ϕ3O = ✸AO ∧ (✷¬EOO
O
k ∧ ✷¬EOO
TTP
k ) = ✸AO ∧ ✷(¬EOO
O
k ∧ ¬EOO
TTP
k ) .
The objective ϕO of O can therefore be expressed by the following LTL formula
ϕO = ϕ
1
O ∧ ✷(ϕ
2
O ∨ ϕ
3
O) . (2)
There are two interpretations of the abort token in the literature. On the one hand the abort
token was never intended to serve as a proof that a protocol instance was not successfully
completed; it was to guarantee that the TTP would never resolve a protocol after it has
been aborted. On the other hand, there is mention of the abort token being used by the
recipient to prove that the protocol was aborted. We take the position that the abort token
may be used to ensure TTP accountability as noted in [28] and hence include it in the
objective of O. If the TTP misbehaves and issues both EORTTPk and AO, we claim that
the objective ϕO of the originator should be violated, but in this case, she has the power
to prove that the TTP misbehaved by presenting both EORTTPk and AO to demonstrate
inconsistent behavior. While having both EORTTPk and AO is a violation of ϕO, having both
EORRk and AO is not a violation of ϕO; once O receives EOR
R
k , we take it that the objective
ϕO is satisfied. While having both EOR
R
k and EOR
TTP
k may be interpreted as O having
inconsistent signatures, we do not consider this to be a violation of O’s objective; given the
nature of asynchronous networks it may well be the case that both these evidences arrive
eventually, one from the TTP and the other from R, as O did not wait long enough before
sending rO1 .
Specification for the recipient R. The objective of the recipient R can be expressed as
follows:
– In all protocol instances, if he gets the evidence of origin EOO, then one of the following
statements should be true:
1. (a) The recipient eventually gets the originator’s signature EOOOk or, (b) he even-
tually gets the originator’s signature EOOTTPk and never gets the abort token AR.
This is expressed by the LTL formula
ϕ1R = (✸EOO
O
k ∨ (✸EOO
TTP
k ∧✷¬AR)) .
2. (a) The recipient eventually gets the abort token and, (b) the originator never gets
his signature EORRk and never gets his signature EOR
TTP
k from the TTP. This is
expressed by the LTL formula
ϕ2R = ✸AR ∧ (✷¬EOR
R
k ∧ ✷¬EOR
TTP
k ) = ✸AR ∧✷(¬EOR
R
k ∧ ¬EOR
TTP
k ) .
The objective ϕR can therefore be expressed by the LTL formula
ϕR = ✷(EOO⇒ (ϕ
1
R ∨ ϕ
2
R)) . (3)
If the TTP misbehaves and issues both EOOTTPk and AR, we claim that the objective ϕR
of the recipient should be violated, but in this case he has the power to prove that the
TTP misbehaved by presenting both EOOTTPk and AR. Similar to the case of O, once R
receives EOOOk , the objective ϕR is satisfied whether or not abort tokens or non-repudiation
evidences are issued by the TTP.
Specification for the trusted third party TTP. The objective of the trusted third
party is to treat both agents symmetrically and be accountable to both agents. It can be
expressed as follows:
– In all protocol instances, if the abort request aO1 or a resolve request r
O
1 or r
R
1 is received,
then eventually the TTP sends the abort token AO or the abort token AR or the origi-
nator’s signature EOOTTPk or the recipient’s signature EOR
TTP
k . This can be expressed
by the LTL formula
ϕ1TTP = ✷((ABR ∨ RES)⇒ (✸AO ∨✸AR ∨✸EOO
TTP
k ∨✸EOR
TTP
k )) .
– In all protocol instances, if the originator’s signature EOOTTPk has been sent to the
recipient, then the originator should eventually get the recipient’s signature EORTTPk
and the agents should never get the abort token. This can be expressed by the LTL
formula
ϕ2TTP = ✷(EOO
TTP
k ⇒ (✸EOR
TTP
k ∧ ✷(¬AO ∧ ¬AR))) .
– Symmetrically, in all protocol instances, if the recipient’s signature EORTTPk has been
sent to the originator, then the recipient should eventually get the originator’s signature
EOOTTPk and the agents should never get the abort token. This can be expressed by the
LTL formula
ϕ3TTP = ✷(EOR
TTP
k ⇒ (✸EOO
TTP
k ∧ ✷(¬AO ∧ ¬AR))) .
– In all protocol instances, if the originator gets the abort token AO, then the recipient
should eventually get the abort token AR and the originator should never get the recip-
ient’s signature EORTTPk and the recipient should never get the originator’s signature
EOOTTPk . This can be expressed by the LTL formula
ϕ4TTP = ✷(AO⇒ (✸AR ∧ ✷(¬EOO
TTP
k ∧ ¬EOR
TTP
k ))) .
– Symmetrically, in all protocol instances, if the recipient gets the abort token AR, then
the originator should eventually get the abort token AO and the originator should never
get the recipient’s signature EORTTPk and the recipient should never get the originator’s
signature EOOTTPk . This can be expressed by the LTL formula
ϕ5TTP = ✷(AR⇒ (✸AO ∧ ✷(¬EOO
TTP
k ∧ ¬EOR
TTP
k ))) .
The objective ϕTTP of the TTP is then defined as:
ϕTTP = ϕ
1
TTP ∧ ϕ
2
TTP ∧ ϕ
3
TTP ∧ ϕ
4
TTP ∧ ϕ
5
TTP . (4)
Note that our objective for the TTP treats both agents symmetrically. In this paper we
present assume-guarantee synthesis for the above objective of the TTP. But in general, the
objective of the TTP can be weakened if desired, by treating the agents asymmetrically,
and the assume-guarantee synthesis technique can be applied with this weakened objective.
We remark that the specifications of the participants in our protocol model are sequences
of messages. Using predicates that are set when messages are sent or received by the agents
or the TTP, we transform those informal specifications into formal objectives using the
predicates and LTL. The following theorem shows that the objectives we have introduced
(2), (3) and (4) imply fairness (1).
Theorem 1 (Objectives imply fairness) We have, ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP ⇒ ϕf .
Proof To prove the assertion, assume towards a contradiction that there exists a path that
satisfies ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP but does not satisfy ϕf . We consider the case when the path does
not satisfy the first conjunct ϕOf = ✷(NRO ⇒ ✸NRR) (a similar argument applies to the
second conjunct). If the path does not satisfy ϕOf , then there is a suffix of the path, where
EOO∧ (EOOOk ∨EOO
TTP
k ) holds but EOR∧ (EOR
R
k ∨EOR
TTP
k ) does not hold at all states
of the suffix. It follows that the path satisfies
✸✷(EOO ∧ (EOO
O
k ∨ EOO
TTP
k ) ∧ (¬EOR ∨ (¬EOR
R
k ∧ ¬EOR
TTP
k ))) . (5)
Consider the objective ϕ2O = (✸EOR
R
k ∨ (✸EOR
TTP
k ∧ ✷¬AO)). Since all predicates are
monotonic, we can rewrite ϕ2O as follows:
ϕ2O = ✸✷(EOR
R
k ∨ (EOR
TTP
k ∧ ¬AO)) .
Similarly, we can rewrite ϕ3O as follows:
ϕ3O = ✸✷(AO ∧ ¬EOO
O
k ∧ ¬EOO
TTP
k ) .
If a path satisfies (5), then it also satisfies ✸✷(EOO
O
k ∨ EOO
TTP
k ). By the monotonicity of
the predicates, we have ✸✷(EOO
O
k ∨ EOO
TTP
k ) is equivalent to ✸✷EOO
O
k ∨ ✸✷EOO
TTP
k .
We consider the following cases to complete the proof:
1. Case 1. Path satisfies ✸✷EOO
O
k . If the path satisfies ✸✷EOO
O
k , then the path does not
satisfy ϕ3O. We now show that the path also does not satisfy ϕ
2
O. Since the path satisfies
✸✷EOO
O
k , it must be the case that message m2 was received by O, as otherwise O will
not send EOOOk . This implies that the path satisfies ✸✷EOR. Since the path satisfies
both ✸✷EOR and (5), it follows that the path must satisfy ✸✷(¬EOR
R
k ∧ ¬EOR
TTP
k ).
Hence the path does not satisfy ✸✷EOR
R
k and ✸✷EOR
TTP
k leading to the path violating
ϕ2O. Since the path does not satisfy both ϕ
2
O and ϕ
3
O, it does not satisfy ϕO, which is a
contradiction.
2. Case 2. Path satisfies ✸✷EOO
TTP
k . If the path satisfies ✸✷EOO
TTP
k , then either O or
R must have sent the resolve request. If the TTP resolves the protocol only to the agent
that sends the resolve request and not the other, then the path does not satisfy ϕTTP,
leading to a contradiction. For ϕTTP to hold, the TTP must have sent both EOO
TTP
k
and EORTTPk , which given the channels between the agents and the TTP are resilient
implies, (a) EOR must have been set by O upon receiving EORTTPk leading to the
path satisfying ✸✷EOR and (b) the path satisfies ✸✷EOR
TTP
k . Since the path satisfies
✸✷EOR and ✸✷EOR
TTP
k , it cannot satisfy (5), leading to a contradiction.

4 Co-synthesis
In this section we first define processes, schedulers and objectives for synthesis along the lines
of [9]. Next we define traditional co-operative [11] and strictly competitive [24, 25] versions
of the co-synthesis problem; we refer to them as weak co-synthesis and classical co-synthesis,
respectively. We then define a formulation of co-synthesis introduced in [9] called assume-
guarantee synthesis. We show later in the paper that the protocol model of Section 2 reduces
to the process model for synthesis that we present in this section.
Variables, valuations, and traces. Let X be a finite set of variables such that each
variable x ∈ X has a finite domain Dx. A valuation f on X is a function f : X →
⋃
x∈X Dx
that assigns to each variable x ∈ X a value f(x) ∈ Dx. We write F [X ] for the set of
valuations on X . A trace on X is an infinite sequence (v0, v1, v2, . . .) ∈ F [X ]ω of valuations
on X . Given a valuation f [X ] ∈ F [X ] and a subset Y ⊆ X of the variables, we denote
by f [X ] ↓ Y the restriction of the valuation f [X ] to the variables in Y . Similarly, for a
trace τ(X) = (v0, v1, v2, . . .) on X , we write τ(X) ↓ Y = (v0 ↓ Y, v1 ↓ Y, v2 ↓ Y, . . .) for
the restriction of τ(X) to the variables in Y . The restriction operator is lifted to sets of
valuations, and to sets of traces.
Processes and refinement. Let Moves be a finite set of moves. For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a process
is defined by the tuple Pi = (Xi, Γi, δi) where,
1. Xi is a finite set of variables of process Pi with X =
⋃3
i=1 Xi being the set of all process
variables,
2. Γi : Fi[Xi]→ 2Moves \ ∅ is a move assignment that given a valuation in Fi[Xi], returns
a non-empty set of moves, where Fi[Xi] is the set of valuations on Xi, and
3. δi : Fi[Xi]×Moves → 2Fi[Xi] \ ∅ is a non-deterministic transition function.
The set of process variables X may be shared between processes. The processes only choose
amongst available moves at every valuation of their variables as determined by their move
assignment. The transition function maps a present valuation and a process move to a
nonempty set of possible successor valuations such that each successor valuation has a unique
pre-image. The uniqueness of the pre-image is a property of fair exchange protocols; unique
messages convey unique content and generate unique valuations.
A refinement of process Pi = (Xi, Γi, δi) is a process P
′
i = (X
′
i, Γ
′
i , δ
′
i) such that:
1. Xi ⊆ X ′i,
2. for all valuations fi[X
′
i] on X
′
i, we have Γ
′
i (fi[X
′
i]) ⊆ Γi(fi[X
′
i] ↓ Xi), and
3. for all valuations fi[X
′
i] on X
′
i and for all moves a ∈ Γ
′
i (fi[X
′
i]), we have δ
′
i(fi[X
′
i], a) ↓
Xi ⊆ δi(fi[X ′i] ↓ Xi, a).
In other words, the refined process P ′i has possibly more variables than the original process
Pi, at most the same moves as the moves of the original process Pi at every valuation, and
every possible update of the variables in Xi given Γ
′
i by P
′
i is a possible update by Pi. We
write P ′i  Pi to denote that P
′
i is a refinement of Pi. Given refinements P
′
1 of P1, P
′
2 of P2
and P ′3 of P3, we write X
′ = X ′1 ∪X
′
2 ∪X
′
3 for the set of variables of all refinements, and we
denote the set of valuations on X ′ by F [X ′].
Schedulers. Given processes Pi, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a scheduler Sc for Pi chooses at each
computation step whether it is process P1’s turn, process P2’s turn or process P3’s turn to
update her variables. Formally, the scheduler Sc is a function Sc : F [X ]∗ → {1, 2, 3} that
maps every finite sequence of global valuations (representing the history of a computation)
to i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, signaling that process Pi is next to update her variables. The scheduler Sc
is fair if it assigns turns to P1, P2 and P3 infinitely often; i.e., for all traces (v0, v1, v2, . . .) ∈
F [X ]ω, there exist infinitely many ji ≥ 0, such that Sc(v0, . . . , vj1) = 1, Sc(v0, . . . , vj2) = 2
and Sc(v0, . . . , vj3 ) = 3. Given three processes P1 = (X1, Γ1, δ1), P2 = (X2, Γ2, δ2) and
P3 = (X3, Γ3, δ3), a scheduler Sc for P1, P2 and P3, and a start valuation v0 ∈ F [X ], the set
of possible traces is:
[[(P1 ‖ P2 ‖ P3 ‖ Sc)(v0)]] = {(v0, v1, v2, . . .) ∈ F [X ]
ω | ∀j ≥ 0. Sc(v0, . . . , vj) = i;
vj+1 ↓ (X \Xi) = vj ↓ (X \Xi);
vj+1 ↓ Xi ∈ δi(vj ↓ Xi, a) for some a ∈ Γi(vj ↓ Xi))} .
Note that during turns of one process Pi, the values of the private variables X \Xi of the
other processes remain unchanged. We define the projection of traces to moves as follows:
(v0, v1, v2, . . .) ↓ Moves = {(a0, a1, a2, . . .) ∈ Moves
ω | ∀j ≥ 0. Sc(v0, . . . , vj) = i;
vj+1 ↓ Xi ∈ δi(vj ↓ Xi, aj); aj ∈ Γi(vj ↓ Xi)} .
Specifications. A specification ϕi for process Pi is a set of traces on X ; that is, ϕi ⊆ F [X ]ω.
We consider only ω-regular specifications [31]. We define boolean operations on specifications
using logical operators such as ∧ (conjunction) and ⇒ (implication).
The input to the co-synthesis problem is given as follows: for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, processes
Pi = (Xi, Γi, δi), specifications ϕi for process i, and a start valuation v0 ∈ F .
Weak co-synthesis. The weak co-synthesis problem is defined as follows: do there exist
refinements P ′i = (X
′
i, Γ
′
i , δ
′
i) and a valuation v
′
0 ∈ F
′, such that,
1. P ′i  Pi and v
′
0 ↓ X = v0, and
2. For all fair schedulers Sc for P ′i we have,
[[(P ′1 ‖ P
′
2 ‖ P
′
3 ‖ Sc)(v
′
0)]] ↓ X ⊆ (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3).
Intuitively, weak co-synthesis or co-operative co-synthesis is a synthesis formulation that
seeks refinements P ′1, P
′
2 and P
′
3 where the processes co-operate to satisfy their respective
objectives.
Classical co-synthesis. The classical co-synthesis problem is defined as follows: do there
exist refinements P ′i = (X
′
i, Γ
′
i , δ
′
i) and a valuation v
′
0 ∈ F
′, such that,
1. P ′i  Pi and v
′
0 ↓ X = v0, and
2. For all fair schedulers Sc for P ′i we have,
(a) [[(P ′1 ‖ P2 ‖ P3 ‖ Sc)(v
′
0)]] ↓ X ⊆ ϕ1;
(b) [[(P1 ‖ P ′2 ‖ P3 ‖ Sc)(v
′
0)]] ↓ X ⊆ ϕ2;
(c) [[(P1 ‖ P2 ‖ P ′3 ‖ Sc)(v
′
0)]] ↓ X ⊆ ϕ3.
Classical or strictly competitive co-synthesis is a formulation that seeks refinements P ′1, P
′
2
and P ′3 such that P
′
1 can satisfy ϕ1 against all possible, and hence adversarial, behaviors of
the other processes; similarly for P ′2 and P
′
3.
Assume-guarantee synthesis. The assume-guarantee synthesis problem is defined as fol-
lows: do there exist refinements P ′i = (X
′
i, Γ
′
i , δ
′
i) and a valuation v
′
0 ∈ F
′, such that,
1. P ′i  Pi and v
′
0 ↓ X = v0, and
2. For all fair schedulers Sc for P ′i we have,
(a) [[(P ′1 ‖ P2 ‖ P3 ‖ Sc)(v
′
0)]] ↓ X ⊆ (ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3)⇒ ϕ1;
(b) [[(P1 ‖ P
′
2 ‖ P3 ‖ Sc)(v
′
0)]] ↓ X ⊆ (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3)⇒ ϕ2;
(c) [[(P1 ‖ P2 ‖ P ′3 ‖ Sc)(v
′
0)]] ↓ X ⊆ (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)⇒ ϕ3;
(d) [[(P ′1 ‖ P
′
2 ‖ P
′
3 ‖ Sc)(v
′
0)]] ↓ X ⊆ (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3).
Assume-guarantee synthesis or conditionally competitive co-synthesis is a formulation that
seeks refinements P ′1, P
′
2 and P
′
3 such that P
′
1 can satisfy ϕ1 as long as processes P2 and
P3 satisfy their objectives; similarly for P
′
2 and P
′
3. This synthesis formulation is well suited
for those cases where processes are primarily concerned with satisfying their own objectives
and only secondarily concerned with violating the objectives of the other processes. We
want protocols to be correct under arbitrary behaviors of the participants, and the arbitrary
or worst case behavior of a participant without sabotaging her own objective, is to first
satisfy her own objective, and only then to falsify the objectives of the other participants.
The primary goal of satisfying her own objective, and secondary goal of falsifying other
participant objectives formally captures this worst case or arbitrary behavior assumption.
We show that this synthesis formulation is the only one that works for fair non-repudiation
protocols. While classical co-synthesis can be solved as zero-sum games, assume-guarantee
synthesis can be solved using non zero-sum games with lexicographic objectives [9]. For
brevity, we drop the initial valuation v0 in the set of traces.
5 Protocol Co-synthesis
In this section, we present our results on synthesizing fair non-repudiation protocols. We use
the process model in Section 4 to define agent and TTP processes, with objectives as defined
in Section 3. We then introduce the protocol synthesis model and show that classical co-
synthesis fails and weak co-synthesis generates unacceptable solutions. We provide a game
theoretic justification of the need for a TTP by showing that without the TTP neither
classical co-synthesis nor assume-guarantee synthesis can be used to synthesize fair non-
repudiation protocols. We define the set PAGS of assume-guarantee refinements and prove
that the refinements are attack-free. We then present an alternate characterization of the set
PAGS and show that the Kremer-Markowitch (KM) non-repudiation protocol with offline
TTP, proposed in [20, 14, 16], is included in PAGS whereas the ASW certified mail protocol
and the GJM protocol are not. Finally, we systematically analyze refinements of the most
general agents and the TTP with respect to their membership in PAGS and show the KM
protocol can be automatically generated.
The process O. We distinguish between the set of messages sent by O and the set of
messages received by O. We first recall, from Section 2, that O sets the predicates EOR,
EORRk , EOR
TTP
k and AO when she receives messages m2, m4, r
O
2 and a
O
2 respectively. We
add to this set the predicates M1, M3, ABR
O and RESO that are set by O when she sends
messages m1, m3, a
O
1 and r
O
1 respectively. We take the set of variables of the process O
as XO = {M1,EOR,M3,EOR
R
k ,EOR
TTP
k ,ABR
O,RESO,AO}; the union of the predicates
set by O when she receives messages and the set of predicates set by O when she sends
messages. By an abuse of notation, we take the set of all messages that can be sent by O as
the moves of process O. By including an idle move ι, which O may choose in lieu of sending
a message, we get the following set of moves for O: MovesO = {ι,m1,m3, aO1 , r
O
1 }.
The process R. Similar to the case of process O, we define the set of variables of process R as
the union of the set of predicates set by R when he sends messages and the set of predicates he
sets when he receives messages. We have the predicates EOO, EOOOk , EOO
TTP
k and AR, set
by R when he receives messagesm1,m3, r
R
2 and a
R
2 respectively. We add to this the predicates
M2,M4 and RES
R, set by R when he sends messagesm2, m4 and r
R
1 respectively. This gives
us the following variables for process R:XR = {EOO,M2,EOO
O
k ,M4,EOO
TTP
k ,RES
R,AR}.
The set of moves for R is given by MovesR = {ι,m2,m4, rR1 }. In Figure 1, we show an
interface automaton for an agent. Since an agent can act either as an originator or a recipient,
we show the actions available to the agent in both roles in the figure.
The process TTP. The predicates ABR and RES are set by the TTP when she
receives an abort or a resolve request from either agent. We add to this the predi-
cates AO2 , A
R
2 , R
O
2 and R
R
2 , set by the TTP when she sends messages a
O
2 , a
R
2 , r
O
2 and
rR2 respectively. We get the following set of process variables for the TTP: XTTP =
{ABR,RES, AO2 , A
R
2 , R
O
2 , R
R
2 }. The set of moves for the TTP are defined as follows:
MovesTTP = {ι, aO2 , a
R
2 , [a
O
2 , a
R
2 ], r
O
2 , r
R
2 , [r
O
2 , r
R
2 ]}. The TTP move [a
O
2 , a
R
2 ] results in the
NRO
EOO
EOR
NRR
EOR
NRR
EOO
NRO
PSfrag replacements
ι
ι
ι ι
ι
ι
ι
ι
ι
m1! m2!
m3! m4!
m1?
m2? m3?
m4?
aO1 !
aO1 !
aO1 !
aO1 !
aO1 !
aO1 !
rO1 !
rO1 !
aR1 !
rR1 !
rR1 !
rR1 !
a∗1!
r∗1 !
a∗1!
r∗1 !
r∗1 !
a∗2?
r∗2?
Fig. 1: An interface automaton that shows the states and enabled moves of the agents O (on
the left) and R (on the right). Move ι is the idle move. The states with no outgoing edges
are terminal. We consider the most liberal behaviors of the agents wherein the abort and
resolve messages can be sent from all states where the agents have the data they need to
send those messages. The predicates are monotonic and are shown in the first state at which
they hold. In states that can be either agent state, we use the ∗ in the messages a∗2, r
∗
1 , r
∗
2 to
denote one of O or R. Abort or resolve requests can be sent from the states marked terminal,
but they have no bearing on the outcome of the protocol and hence we omit them.
TTP sending messages aO2 to O and a
R
2 to R. The TTP can choose to send them in any
order; all that is guaranteed is that both messages will be sent by the TTP. Similarly for
the TTP move [rO2 , r
R
2 ]. The moves for the TTP are shown in Table 1; these include the
moves for the TTP in the ASW certified mail protocol [4], the GJM protocol [13] and the
KM protocol [20]. We show moves for the TTP with and without a persistent database
for completeness. Since it is trivially the case that TTP accountability cannot be satisfied
without a persistent database, we do not consider the absence of a persistent database in
the rest of this paper.
The protocol synthesis model. We now have all the ingredients to define our protocol
synthesis model. Given process O, process R and process TTP as defined above, we take
X = XO ∪XR ∪XTTP as the joint set of process variables. We take the objectives ϕO, ϕR
and ϕTTP for the processes O, R and TTP respectively, as defined in Section 3. The set of
traces [[O ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]], given Sc is a fair scheduler, is then the joint behavior of the
most general agents and the most general TTP, subject to the constraint that they can only
send messages based on what they know at every valuation of their variables. A protocol is
a refinement O′  O, R′  R and TTP′  TTP, where each participant has a restricted set
of moves at every valuation of the process variables; the restrictions constituting the rules of
the protocol. We take a protocol state as a valuation over the process variables. By an abuse
of notation, we represent every state of the protocol by the set of variables that are set to
true in that state; for example a valuation f = {M1,EOO,M2,EOR} corresponds to the
Agent moves Enabled TTP moves
Without DB With a persistent DB
ASW GJM KM
O sends aO1 a
O
2 [a
O
2 , a
R
2 ] If R has recovered, If recovered, then r
O
2 If aborted or
invite O to recover else aO2 recovered, then
else aO2 ι else [a
O
2 , a
R
2 ]
O sends rO1 r
O
2 [r
O
2 , r
R
2 ] If aborted, then a
O
2 If aborted, then a
O
2 If aborted or
else rO2 else r
O
2 recovered, then
ι else [rO2 , r
R
2 ]
R sends rR1 r
R
2 [r
O
2 , r
R
2 ] If aborted, then a
R
2 If aborted, then a
R
2 If aborted or
else rR2 else r
R
2 recovered, then
ι else [rO2 , r
R
2 ]
Table 1: In this table we list the choices of moves available to the trusted third party. Each
row begins with a message sent by an agent to the TTP followed by the choices available to
the TTP in all subsequent states. The TTP moves for the ASW, GJM and KM protocols
are shown.
state of the protocol after messages m1 and m2 have been received. f ↓ XR = {EOO,M2}
corresponds to the restriction of the valuation f to the variables of process R; all that R
knows in this state is that he has received m1 and has sent m2. We take v0 as the initial
valuation where all variables are false. The set of variables in the refinements O′  O, R′  R
and TTP′  TTP are the same as those in processes O, R and TTP, respectively, and all
traces begin with the initial valuation v0. We do not model the set of channels explicitly but
reason against all possible behaviors of unreliable channels. We assume that every message
at least includes the name of the sender, is signed with the private key of the sender and
encrypted with the public key of the recipient.
The following theorem states that the protocol model from Section 2 and the protocol
synthesis model presented above are equivalent. Let A0 = O, A1 = R and A2 = TTP be the
most general participants with A = {A0, A1, A2} and variables V0 = XO for A0, V1 = XR
for A1 and V2 = XTTP for A2 as defined above. It is then easy to show that,
Theorem 2 (Trace equivalence of models) For all participant restrictions A′i and
refinements O′  O, R′  R and TTP′  TTP, such that i ∈ {0, 1, 2} with j = O when
i = 0, j = R when i = 1 and j = TTP when i = 2, for all valuations v ∈ F [Vi], if
Λ′i(v) = Γj′ (v), then we have, Runs({A
′
0, A
′
1, A
′
2}) = [[O
′ ‖ R′ ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]].
We note that in Theorem 2, when we say all restrictions A′i or all refinements O
′, R′,
and TTP′, the most general participants are included (for example O′ can be O) and hence
Theorem 2 covers trace equivalence for all required cases.
5.1 Failure of Classical and Weak Co-Synthesis
In this subsection we show that classical co-synthesis fails while weak co-synthesis generates
solutions that are not attack-free and are hence unacceptable. We first tackle classical co-
synthesis. In order to show failure of classical co-synthesis we need to show that one of the
following conditions:
1. [[(O′ ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖ Sc)]] ⊆ ϕO;
2. [[(O ‖ R′ ‖ TTP ‖ Sc)]] ⊆ ϕR;
3. [[(O ‖ R ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc)]] ⊆ ϕTTP,
can be violated. We show that for all refinements R′ of the recipient R, that is, for every
sequence of moves ending in a move chosen by R′, there exist moves for the other processes
O, TTP and Sc, and a behavior of the the channels, to extend that sequence such that the
objective ϕR is violated. Since R should satisfy his objective against all possible behaviors
of the channels, to show failure of classical co-synthesis it suffices to fix the behavior of all
channels. We assume the channels eventually deliver all messages.
Theorem 3 (Classical co-synthesis fails for R) For all refinements R′  R, the
following assertion holds:
[[O ‖ R′ ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ ϕR.
Proof We consider every valuation of the process variables and the set of all possible moves
that can be selected by R at each valuation. This defines all possible refinements of R.
Since every valuation is the result of a finite sequence of moves (messages) chosen (sent)
by the agents and the TTP, it suffices to consider all possible finite sequences of messages
received, ending in a message chosen by R. Let τ = (v0, v1, . . . , vn) be a finite sequence of
valuations seen in a partial protocol run, where v0 is the starting valuation. Let σ = τ ↓
Moves = 〈a0, a1, . . . , an−1〉 be the corresponding sequence of n moves seen in the run. At
the beginning of a protocol run, we have σ = ∅. In the following, on a case by case basis, we
show the sequence of moves seen in a partial protocol run, ending in a move chosen by R,
followed by moves for O, TTP and Sc that leads to a violation of ϕR.
R1: 〈m1, ι〉
– Whenever Sc schedules O, she chooses the idle action ι. Since EOO is true, as long as
O does not abort the protocol but chooses to remain idle, ϕR is violated.
– ϕR and ϕO are violated but ϕTTP is satisfied.
R2: 〈m1,m2〉
– Sc schedules O; O sends rO1 to TTP;
– Sc schedules TTP; TTP resolves the protocol for O and sends rO2 ;
– Sc schedules O; O aborts the protocol by sending aO1 ;
– Sc schedules TTP; TTP sends [aO2 , a
R
2 ] with R having no option of obtaining O’s sig-
nature;
– ϕR and ϕTTP are violated but ϕO is satisfied.
R3: 〈m1, rR1 〉
– Sc schedules TTP; TTP resolves and sends [rO2 , r
R
2 ];
– Sc schedules O; O sends aO1 to TTP;
– Sc schedules TTP; TTP sends [aO2 , a
R
2 ];
– ϕR, ϕTTP and ϕO are violated.
R4: 〈m1,m2, rR1 〉
– Sc schedules TTP; TTP resolves and sends [rO2 , r
R
2 ];
– Sc schedules O; O sends aO1 to TTP;
– Sc schedules TTP; TTP sends aR2 ;
– ϕR and ϕTTP are violated but ϕO is satisfied.

It is easy to verify that the sequences in the proof are exhaustive. From the agent interface
automaton shown in Figure 1 we can extract all the partial sequences of moves ending in a
move of R and similarly for O. In all of the above cases, ϕR is violated. In all of the above
cases ϕR ∧ ϕTTP is also violated. This shows that for all counter moves of O and the TTP,
violation of the specification of R also violates the specification of O or the TTP. Since O
and the TTP co-operate, O never sends m3, instead choosing to use the TTP to get her
non-repudiation evidence while denying R the ability to get his evidence.
The following example illustrates that given our objectives, given a reasonable TTP as
defined in Section 2, weak co-synthesis yields solutions that are not attack-free and are hence
unacceptable.
Example 1. (Weak co-synthesis generates unacceptable solutions) Consider a
refinement O′, R′ and TTP′, that generates the following sequence of messages:
〈m1,m2, rO1 , r
O
2 , r
R
1 , r
R
2 〉; the agents send m1 and m2 and then resolve the protocol indi-
vidually. We assume that TTP′ needs both m1 and m2 to resolve the protocol for either
O or R. The trace corresponding to this sequence satisfies weak co-synthesis, but then this
behavior of the TTP, that assumes co-operative agent behavior, is not attack-free. Taking
Y = {R}, consider the following Y -attack where R exploits the fact that a reasonable TTP
responds with rR2 when she receives r
R
1 . If R sends a resolve request immediately after re-
ceiving m1 we get the message sequence 〈m1, rR1 , r
R
2 〉. In this case ϕR is satisfied, but ϕO
and ϕTTP are violated. The only way to satisfy ϕO and ϕTTP is if O
′ sends rO1 , which she
cannot do, as she does not know the contents of m2. This is an attack on the ASW certified
mail protocol that compromises fairness for O [16]. Similarly, there exists a Y -attack for
Y = {O,R} as follows: after resolving the protocol, if O decides to send m3 and R responds
with m4, we get the following message sequence: 〈m1,m2, rO1 , r
O
2 ,m3,m4〉. In this case, the
objectives ϕO and ϕR are satisfied but the objective ϕTTP is violated; a reasonable TTP will
only send messages in response to abort and resolve requests and thus needs rR1 to satisfy
ϕTTP. Therefore, solutions that satisfy weak co-synthesis may not be attack-free. 
5.2 The Need for a TTP
We now provide a justification of the need for a TTP in fair non-repudiation protocols,
given our synthesis objective. While this follows from [12, 21], our proof gives an alternative
game-theoretic proof through synthesis. We present the following theorem which shows that
if we remove the TTP, then both classical and assume-guarantee synthesis fail to synthesize
a fair non-repudiation protocol.
Theorem 4 (Classical and assume-guarantee synthesis fail without the TTP)
For all refinements O′  O, the following assertions hold:
1. Classical co-synthesis fails: [[O′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ ϕO.
2. Assume-guarantee synthesis fails:
(a) [[O′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ (ϕR ⇒ ϕO) or,
(b) [[O′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕR ⇒ ϕO); [[R
′ ‖ O ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ⇒ ϕR); and
[[O′ ‖ R′ ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR).
Proof We note that as the TTP is not involved, AO, AR, EOOTTPk and EOR
TTP
k are always
false. The agent objectives then simplify to,
ϕO = ✸M1 ∧✸EOR
R
k ; ϕR = ✷(EOO⇒ ✸EOO
O
k ) .
For assertion 1, consider an arbitrary refinement O′  O. We show a witness trace in
[[O′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] that violates ϕO. If O
′ does not send m1 in the initial protocol state v0, then
we have a witness trace that trivially violates ϕO and hence [[O
′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ ϕO. Assume
O′ sends m1 and the channel between O and R eventually delivers all messages. Consider
a partial trace ending in protocol state {M1,EOO,M2,EOR}; messages m1 and m2 have
been received. The only choice of moves for O′ in this state of the protocol are ι or m3. If O
′
chooses ι, then the trace does not satisfy ϕO and hence [[O
′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ ϕO. If O
′ chooses
m3 and upon receiving m3 if R decides to stop participating in the protocol by choosing ι,
then the trace satisfies ϕR but violates ϕO and hence [[O
′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ ϕO.
For assertion 2, consider an arbitrary refinement O′  O. If O′ does not send m1 in the
initial protocol state v0, we have a witness trace that trivially violates ϕO but satisfies ϕR.
Therefore, the trace does not satisfy ϕR ⇒ ϕO and [[O
′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ (ϕR ⇒ ϕO). Assume
the channels eventually deliver all messages and as in the proof of assertion 1, consider a
partial trace ending in protocol state {M1,EOO,M2,EOR}. To produce a witness trace we
have the following cases based on the move chosen by O′:
– Case 1. O′ chooses ι. Since O′ chooses ι, she does not send her signature EOOOk .
Therefore, the trace does not satisfy ϕR. Since R sends m4 only in response to m3,
O does not get EORRk from R in this case. Therefore, the trace does not satisfy ϕO
either and hence satisfies ϕO ⇒ ϕR and ϕR ⇒ ϕO but does not satisfy ϕO ∧ ϕR.
This leads to, [[O′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ⇒ ϕR) and [[O
′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕR ⇒ ϕO) but
[[O′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR)
– Case 2. O′ chooses m3. Since m3 is eventually delivered, R gets his non-repudiation
evidence and the trace satisfies ϕR. If R now stops participating in the protocol and
chooses the idle move ι instead of sending m4, then O does not get her non-repudiation
evidence and the trace does not satisfy ϕO. We therefore have a witness trace that does
not satisfy ϕR ⇒ ϕO. This leads to, [[O
′ ‖ R ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ (ϕR ⇒ ϕO)

If the agents co-operate, then a refinement O′  O that sends m1 and then m3 upon
receivingm2 and similarly a refinement R
′  R that sendsm2 andm4 upon receivingm1 and
m3 respectively, is a solution to the weak co-synthesis problem. The sequence of messages
in this case is precisely 〈m1,m2,m3,m4〉 which is the main protocol in all the fair exchange
protocols we have studied. The problem arises when either O or R are dishonest and try to
cheat the other agent.
5.3 Assume-guarantee Solutions are Attack-Free
In this subsection we show that assume-guarantee solutions are attack free; no coalition of
participants can violate the objective of at least one of the other participants while satisfying
their own objectives. Let P ′ = (O′,R′,TTP′) be a tuple of refinements of the agents and the
TTP. For two refinements P ′ = (O′,R′,TTP′) and P ′′ = (O′′,R′′,TTP′′), we write P ′  P ′′
if O′  O′′, R′  R′′ and TTP′  TTP′′. Given P = (O,R,TTP), the most general behaviors
of the agents and the TTP, let PAGS be the set of all possible refinements P
′  P that satisfy
the conditions of assume-guarantee synthesis. For a refinement P ′ = (O′,R′,TTP′) to be
in PAGS , we require that the refinements O
′  O, R′  R and TTP′  TTP satisfy the
following conditions:
For all fair schedulers Sc, for all possible behaviors of the channels,
1. [[(O′ ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖ Sc)]] ⊆ (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO;
2. [[(O ‖ R′ ‖ TTP ‖ Sc)]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR;
3. [[(O ‖ R ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc)]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP;
4. [[(O′ ‖ R′ ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc)]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP).
We now characterize the smallest restriction on the refinements TTP′  TTP that satisfy
the implication condition,
[[(O ‖ R ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc)]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP . (6)
In order to characterize the smallest restriction on TTP′ we first define the following con-
straints on the TTP and prove that they are both necessary and sufficient to satisfy (6).
AGS constraints on the TTP. We say that a refinement TTP′  TTP satisfies the AGS
constraints on the TTP, if TTP′ satisfies the the following constraints:
1. Abort constraint. If the first request received by the TTP is an abort request, then her
response to that request should be [aO2 , a
R
2 ];
2. Resolve constraint. If the first request received by the TTP is a resolve request, then her
response to that request should be [rO2 , r
R
2 ];
3. Accountability constraint. If the first response from the TTP is [x, y], then for all subse-
quent abort or resolve requests her response should be in the set {ι, x, y, [x, y]}.
We assume a reasonable TTP, as defined in Section 2; in particular she only responds to abort
or resolve requests. In the following lemma, in assertion 1 we show that for all refinements
TTP′  TTP that satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, we have TTP′ is inviolable , i.e.,
neither agent can violate the objective ϕTTP, and hence satisfies the implication condition
(6); in assertion (2) we show that if TTP′ does not satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP,
the implication condition (6) is not satisfied.
Lemma 1 For all refinements TTP′  TTP, the following assertions hold:
1. if TTP′ satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP, then
[[O ‖ R ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] ⊆ ϕTTP ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP.
2. if TTP′ does not satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, then
[[O ‖ R ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP.
Proof For assertion 1, consider an arbitrary TTP′  TTP that satisfies the AGS constraints
on the TTP. We consider the following cases of sets of traces of [[O ‖ R ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] for the
proof:
– Case 1. Neither agent aborts nor resolves the protocol. In these traces, since the TTP
is neither sent an abort nor a resolve request, ϕTTP is satisfied trivially. Therefore, all
these traces satisfy (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP.
– Case 2. The first request to the TTP is an abort request. For the set of traces where the
first request to the TTP is an abort request, given TTP′ satisfies the AGS constraints
on the TTP, by the abort constraint, the response of the TTP to this request is [aO2 , a
R
2 ].
For all subsequent abort or resolve requests, by the accountability constraint, the TTP
responds with a move in set {ι, aO2 , a
R
2 , [a
O
2 , a
R
2 ]}. This implies that both agents get
the abort token and neither agent gets non-repudiation evidences. Therefore, ϕTTP is
satisfied for all these traces and hence (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP is also satisfied.
– Case 3. The first request to the TTP is a resolve request. Similar to the proof of Case 2,
in the set of traces where the first request to the TTP is a resolve request, by the resolve
constraint, the TTP responds to this request with move [rO2 , r
R
2 ]. Since the response of
the TTP to all subsequent abort or resolve requests is in the set {ι, rO2 , r
R
2 , [r
O
2 , r
R
2 ]},
by the accountability constraint, the agents get their non-repudiation evidences and
neither gets the abort token. Therefore, ϕTTP is satisfied for all these traces and hence
(ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP is also satisfied and the result follows.
For assertion 2, consider an arbitrary TTP′  TTP that does not satisfy the AGS
constraints on the TTP. We assume a reasonable TTP and consider violation of the AGS
constraints on the TTP on a case by case basis. For each case we produce a witness trace
that violates the implication condition (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP. We proceed as follows:
– Case 1. The abort constraint is violated. To produce a witness trace we consider a
partial trace that ends in protocol state {M1,ABR
O}; O requests the TTP to abort
the protocol after sending message m1 but before it is received. Since TTP
′ violates
the abort constraint, the only choice of moves for TTP′ are ι or aO2 . This leads to the
following cases:
• Case (a). TTP′ chooses ι. It is trivially the case that ϕTTP is violated for this trace
as ϕ1TTP is violated. At this stage in the protocol, there exists a behavior of O,
R and the channel between O and R, where the channel delivers all messages and
the agents co-operate and complete the protocol by exchanging their signatures.
Therefore, ϕO ∧ ϕR is satisfied but ϕTTP is violated. Therefore, the trace does not
satisfy (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP.
• Case (b). TTP′ chooses aO2 . Since the channel between the agents and the TTP is
resilient, O eventually receives her abort token AO. At this stage in the protocol,
there exists a behavior of O, R and the channel between O and R such that the
channel delivers all messages and the agents exchange their signatures, leading to
the satisfaction of ϕO ∧ϕR but a violation of ϕ4TTP and hence ϕTTP. Therefore, the
trace does not satisfy (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP.
– Case 2. The resolve constraint is violated. To produce a witness trace we consider a
partial trace that ends in protocol state {M1,EOO,M2,EOR,RES
O}; O resolves the
protocol after messages m1 and m2 have been received. Since TTP
′ violates the resolve
constraint, the only choice of moves for TTP′ are ι or rO2 . An argument similar to the
argument for cases 1(a) and 1(b) again leads to the satisfaction of ϕO∧ϕR but a violation
of ϕTTP.
– Case 3. The accountability constraint is violated. To produce a wit-
ness trace we consider a partial trace that ends in protocol state
{M1,EOO,M2,EOR,ABR
O,RESR, AO2 , A
R
2 ,AO,AR}; O aborts the protocol and
R resolves the protocol after messagesm1 and m2 have been received. The TTP receives
the abort request before the resolve request and aborts the protocol by sending [aO2 , a
R
2 ].
Since TTP′ violates the accountability constraint, the only choice of moves for TTP′ to
the resolve request from R are rR2 or [r
O
2 , r
R
2 ]. The leads to the following cases:
• Case (a). TTP′ chooses rR2 . This violates ϕ
4
TTP and ϕ
5
TTP and hence violates ϕTTP.
At this stage in the protocol, there exists a behavior of O, R and the channel between
O and R such that the agents exchange their signatures and complete the protocol
thus satisfying ϕO ∧ ϕR. Therefore, this trace does not satisfy the implication con-
dition (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP.
• Case (b). TTP′ chooses [rO2 , r
R
2 ]. This violates ϕ
4
TTP and ϕ
5
TTP and hence violates
ϕTTP. An argument similar to Case 2(a) leads to a violation of (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP
for this trace.
As we have shown witness traces that do not satisfy the implication condition (ϕO ∧
ϕR) ⇒ ϕTTP when TTP
′ violates any of the AGS constraints on the TTP, the result
follows.

In the following theorem we show that all refinements P ′ ∈ PAGS are attack-free; no
subset of participants can violate the objective of at least one of the other participants while
satisfying their own objectives.
Theorem 5 All refinements P ′ ∈ PAGS are attack-free.
Proof We show that for all refinements P ′ ∈ PAGS there exists no Y -attack for all Y ⊆
{O,R,TTP}. Let P ′ = (O′,R′,TTP′) and A = {O,R,TTP} be the set of participants. We
have the following cases:
– Case 1. |Y | = 0. In this case Y = ∅ and (A\Y )′ = {O′,R′,TTP′}. Since (A\Y )′ are the
refinements in P ′ which is in PAGS , by the weak co-synthesis condition, the objectives
ϕO, ϕR and ϕTTP are satisfied. Therefore there is no Y -attack in this case.
– Case 2. |Y | = 1. We first show that there is no Y -attack for Y = {O}. The case
of Y = {R} is similar. By Lemma 1 (assertion 2), for all refinements P ′ ∈ PAGS ,
the refinement TTP′ must satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP. This implies, by
Lemma 1 (assertion 1), neither O nor R can violate ϕTTP. Since ϕTTP cannot be violated,
a Y -attack in this case must generate a trace where ϕR is violated but ϕO is satisfied. But
this violates the implication condition, ϕO ∧ ϕTTP ⇒ ϕR, contradicting the assumption
that P ′ ∈ PAGS . We now show that there is no Y -attack for Y = {TTP}. Since we
assume the TTP is reasonable, in all traces where neither agent sends an abort nor a
resolve request to the TTP, the TTP cannot violate the agent objectives. In all traces
where the first request from the agents is an abort request, given a reasonable TTP,
since the trace satisfies ϕTTP, it must be the case that the response to that request is
[aO2 , a
R
2 ]. Similarly, for resolve requests. If the first response of the TTP is [x, y], then
the only responses that satisfy ϕTTP, to all subsequent abort and resolve requests, are
in the set {ι, x, y, [x, y]}. This implies that either the agents get abort tokens or non-
repudiation evidences but never both, which implies ϕO and ϕR are satisfied in all these
traces. Therefore there is no Y -attack in this case as well.
– Case 3. |Y | = 2. Since P ′ ∈ PAGS , by the implication conditions of assume-guarantee
synthesis, there cannot be a Y -attack where |Y | = 2.
– Case 4. |Y | = 3. It is trivially the case that there is no Y -attack as (A \ Y )′ = ∅.
Since we have shown that for all refinements P ′ ∈ PAGS , for all Y ⊆ A, there is no Y -attack
in P ′, we conclude that all refinements in PAGS are attack-free. 
We now present the following theorem that establishes conditions for any refinement in
PAGS to be an attack-free fair non-repudiation protocol.
Theorem 6 (Fair non-repudiation protocols) For all refinements P ′ ∈ PAGS, if [[O
′ ‖
R′ ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] ∩ (✸NRO ∧ ✸NRR) 6= ∅, then P ′ is an attack-free fair non-repudiation
protocol.
Proof Consider an arbitrary refinement P ′ = (O′,R′,TTP′) ∈ PAGS . Since P ′ ∈ PAGS ,
by Theorem 5, it is attack-free. Further, by the weak co-synthesis condition, we have [[O′ ‖
R′ ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP) and hence by Theorem 1, we have [[O
′ ‖ R′ ‖
TTP′ ‖ Sc]] ⊆ ϕf . Thus P ′ satisfies fairness. Using PCS, that provides the designated
verifier property, to encrypt all messages, we ensure that the protocol is abuse-free. Since
[[O′ ‖ R′ ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] ∩ (✸NRO ∧ ✸NRR) 6= ∅, the refinement P ′ enables an exchange of
signatures and hence is an exchange protocol. Given NRO and NRR are non-repudiation
evidences for R and O respectively, we conclude that P ′ is an attack-free fair non-repudiation
protocol. 
5.4 Analysis of Existing Fair Non-repudiation Protocols as PAGS Solutions
In this subsection we analyze existing fair non-repudiation protocols and check if they are
solutions to assume-guarantee synthesis. To facilitate the analysis, we first present an alter-
nate characterization of the set PAGS of assume-guarantee refinements. We then show that
the KM non-repudiation protocol with offline TTP is in PAGS whereas the ASW certified
mail protocol and the GJM protocol are not. Finally, we present a systematic exploration
of refinements leading to the KM protocol. Towards an alternate characterization of PAGS ,
we begin by defining constraints on O, similar to the AGS constraints on the TTP that
ensure satisfaction of the implication condition for O. We then define maximal and minimal
refinements that satisfy all the implication conditions of assume-guarantee synthesis and
introduce a bounded idle time requirement to ensure satisfaction of weak co-synthesis.
AGS constraints on O. Given P = (O,R,TTP), the most general behaviors of the agents
and the TTP, we say a refinement P ′  P satisfies the AGS constraints on O, if the following
conditions hold:
1. aO1 6∈ ΓO′(v0);
2. EOOOk 6∈ ΓO′({M1,EOR,ABR
O}); and
3. aO1 6∈ ΓO′({M1,EOR,M3}).
In the Appendix, we show that these constraints are both necessary and sufficient restric-
tions on the moves of O that satisfy the implication condition (ϕR∧ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO of assume-
guarantee synthesis. We also show that all refinements R′  R satisfy the implication con-
dition (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR of assume-guarantee synthesis.
The maximal refinement P∗. We define the maximal refinement P∗ = (O∗,R∗,TTP∗)
as follows:
1. O∗  O satisfies the AGS constraints on O and for all O′ that satisfy the constraints,
we have O′  O∗;
2. R∗ = R; and
3. TTP∗  TTP satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP and for all TTP′ that satisfy
the constraints, we have TTP′  TTP∗.
We show in the Appendix the correspondence between P∗ and the smallest restriction on
the moves of O and the TTP so that P∗ is a witness to PAGS . While there are restrictions
on O and the TTP, there are no restrictions on R.
The minimal refinement P∗. We present the smallest refinement P∗ = (O∗,R∗,TTP∗)
in PAGS , as the largest restriction on the moves of O, R and the TTP, as follows:
1. P∗  P
∗;
2. MovesO∗ = {m1, a
O
1 };
3. MovesR∗ = {ι};
4. O∗ satisfies the AGS constraints on O; and
5. TTP∗ satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP.
Protocol 1: The KM, ASW and GJM Main Protocol
1 O sends m1 to R;
2 R sends m2 to O;
3 if (R does not send m2 on time) then
4 O sends aO1 to the TTP;
5 else
6 O sends m3 to R;
7 if (O does not send m3 on time) then
8 R sends rR1 to the TTP;
9 else
10 R sends m4 to O;
11 if (R does not send m4 on time) then
12 O sends rO1 to the TTP;
If m1 6∈ MovesO∗ , then ϕO cannot be satisfied as O∗ does have the ability to initiate
a protocol instance. If aO1 6∈ MovesO∗ , then ϕO cannot be satisfied whether or not m1
is delivered, as R∗ has no choice of moves other than ι. If O∗ does not satisfy the AGS
constraints on O and sends aO1 in the initial state of the protocol v0, then the resulting trace
trivially violates ϕO while satisfying ϕR ∧ ϕTTP.
The bounded idle time requirement. We say that a refinement P ′ satisfies bounded
idle time if O and the TTP in P ′ choose the idle move ι, when scheduled by Sc, at most
b times for a finite b ∈ N. We prove that satisfaction of the bounded idle time requirement
is both necessary and sufficient to ensure satisfaction of the weak co-synthesis condition of
assume-guarantee synthesis, for all refinements that satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP
and the AGS constraints on O, in the Appendix.
Alternate characterization of PAGS. We now use P∗ and P
∗ to provide an alternate
characterization of the set PAGS . We first define the following set of refinements P:
P = {P ′ = (O′,R′,TTP′) | P ′ satisfies bounded idle time; P∗  P
′  P∗;
TTP′ satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP} .
The following lemma states that the set P and the set PAGS coincide. We present the lemma
here and prove it in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 (Alternate characterization of PAGS) We have P = PAGS.
The KM non-repudiation protocol. The KM protocol, like the ASW and GJM protocols
consists of a main protocol, an abort subprotocol and a resolve subprotocol. The main
protocol is the same as in the ASW and GJM protocols and is defined in terms of messages
in Protocol 1. The abort subprotocol and the resolve subprotocol are defined in Table 1.
Let PKM = (OKM ,RKM ,TTPKM ) correspond to the agent and TTP refinements in the
KM protocol. Since O does not abort the protocol in state v0 and in state {M1,EOR,M3}
in OKM , it follows that O∗  OKM  O
∗. It is easy to verify that R∗  RKM  R
∗
and TTP∗  TTPKM  TTP
∗. Moreover, TTPKM satisfies the AGS constraints on the
TTP and PKM satisfies bounded idle time. Therefore PKM ∈ P and hence by Lemma 2,
PKM ∈ PAGS .
The ASW certified mail protocol. The ASW certified mail protocol differs from the
KM protocol in its abort and resolve sequences. To define the abort protocol, the TTP
needs a move reqO that can be used to request O to resolve a protocol instance if R
has already resolved it. The abort and resolve subprotocols are defined in Table 1. Let
PASW = (OASW ,RASW ,TTPASW ) correspond to the agent and TTP refinements in
the ASW certified mail protocol. Since TTPASW neither has move [a
O
2 , a
R
2 ] nor [r
O
2 , r
R
2 ],
TTPASW does not satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP and hence by Lemma 1 (asser-
tion 2), we have PASW 6∈ PAGS . Moreover, the ASW certified mail protocol is not attack-free
as shown by the following attacks [16]: Consider a behavior of the channels that deliver all
messages and the sequence of messages 〈m1, rR1 , r
R
2 , a
O
1 , req
O〉. This is a valid sequence in
the ASW protocol. In this sequence a malicious R decides to resolve the protocol after
receiving m1 and thus succeeds in getting EOO
TTP
k . When OASW attempts to abort the
protocol, TTPASW expects her to resolve the protocol as R has already resolved it, but
OASW cannot do so as she does not have m2. Therefore, ϕO is violated; OASW cannot abort
or resolve the protocol, neither can she get R’s signature. Consider the sequence of messages
〈m1,m2, rO1 , r
O
2 , a
O
1 , a
O
2 〉. This is an attack that compromises fairness for R; in the words of
[16] the protocol designers did not foresee that O could resolve the protocol and then abort
it. This violates ϕR and TTP accountability, violating ϕTTP, while satisfying ϕO.
The GJM protocol. The GJM protocol differs in the abort and resolve sequences as shown
in Table 1. Garay et al., introduced the notion of abuse-freeness and invented private contract
signatures or PCS , a cryptographic primitive that ensures abuse-freeness and optionally
TTP accountability [13]. Further, the GJM protocol is faithful to the informal definition of
fairness in that, when a protocol instance is aborted, neither agent gets partial information
that can be used to negotiate a contract with a third party. This is ensured by the use
of PCS which provides the designated verifier property; only R can verify the authenticity
of a message signed by O and vice versa. The use of PCS in addition to the fixes to the
original protocol proposed in [28] ensure that the protocol is free from replay attacks, is fair
and abuse-free. Let PGJM = (OGJM ,RGJM ,TTPGJM ) correspond to the agent and TTP
refinements in the GJM protocol. Since TTPGJM neither has move [a
O
2 , a
R
2 ] nor [r
O
2 , r
R
2 ],
TTPGJM does not satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP and hence by Lemma 1 (assertion
2), we have PGJM 6∈ PAGS . PGJM does not provide TTP inviolability and is not attack-free
by our definition. Consider the message sequence g = 〈m1,m2,m3, rO1 , r
O
2 〉; agent R does not
send his final signature but goes idle and stops participating in the protocol after receiving
O’s signature. OGJM resolves the protocol by sending r
O
1 and gets EOR
TTP
k . In this case,
while the objectives of O and R are satisfied, the TTP cannot satisfy ϕTTP unless RGJM
co-operates and sends a resolve request rR1 after having satisfied his objective, which he may
never do; it is rather unrealistic to expect that he will. Precisely, g ∈ [[O ‖ R ‖ TTPGJM ‖ Sc]]
and g 6∈ (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP.
Theorem 7 The refinement corresponding to the KM non-repudiation protocol is in PAGS
and the refinements corresponding to the ASW certified mail protocol and the GJM protocol
are not in PAGS.
Computation. We can obtain the solution of assume-guarantee synthesis by solving graph
games with secure equilibria [10]. In fact, the refinements that satisfy assume-guarantee
synthesis precisely correspond to secure equilibrium strategies of players in the game. This
result was presented in [9]. All the objectives we consider in this paper are boolean combina-
tions of Bu¨chi (✷✸) and co-Bu¨chi (✸✷) objectives. It follows from [9] that secure equilibria
with combinations of Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi objectives can be solved in polynomial time. This
Delivered message sequences Moves for O1 and R1
Choices for O1 Choices for R1
〈〉 m1 m1 ι ι ι
〈m1〉 ι a
O
1 ι m2 either ι or m2
〈m1,m2〉 a
O
1 a
O
1 ι ι ι
〈m1,m2,m3〉 ∅ ∅ ι m4 ι
Table 2: The moves that satisfy the objectives of assume-guarantee synthesis for O1 and R1
are shown in this table at relevant protocol states represented by message sequences, when
the agents have no ability to resolve the protocol.
gives us a polynomial time algorithm for the assume-guarantee synthesis of fair exchange
protocols.
From PAGS to PKM . We now first present a systematic exploration of the refinements of
P = (O,R,TTP), the most general behavior of the agents and the TTP, leading to the KM
protocol. We consider the following refinements, that we assume satisfy bounded idle time
and the AGS constraints on the TTP, and study their properties:
1. P∗ = (O∗,R∗,TTP∗); the minimal refinement.
2. P1 = (O1,R1,TTP1) with
MovesO1 = MovesO∗ ∪ {ι,m3}, MovesR1 = MovesR∗ ∪ {m2,m4} and TTP1 = TTP
∗.
3. P2 = (O2,R2,TTP2) with
MovesO2 = MovesO1 ∪ {r
O
1 }, MovesR2 = MovesR1 and TTP2 = TTP
∗.
4. P3 = (O3,R3,TTP3) with
MovesO3 = MovesO2 \ {a
O
1 }, MovesR3 = MovesR1 ∪ {r
R
1 } and TTP3 = TTP
∗.
5. P∗ = (O∗,R∗,TTP∗); the maximal refinement.
Analysis of the refinement P∗. It is easy to check that while P∗ ∈ PAGS , it always ends
aborted as aO1 is the only choice of moves for O∗ after m1 is sent. It is not an exchange
protocol as it does not enable an exchange of signatures.
Analysis of the refinement P1. In this case, the agents do not have the ability to resolve
the protocol. The objectives of the agent and the TTP then reduce to,
ϕO = ✸M1 ∧ ✷(✸EOR
R
k ∨ (✸AO ∧ ✷¬EOO
O
k )),
ϕR = ✷(EOO⇒ (✸EOO
O
k ∨ (✸AR ∧ ✷¬EOR
R
k )),
ϕTTP = ✷(ABR⇒ (✸AO ∨✸AR)) ∧ ✷(AO⇒ ✸AR) ∧ ✷(AR⇒ ✸AO) .
The agent moves that extend partial protocol runs such that the implication conditions
of assume-guarantee synthesis are satisfied in all resulting traces is shown in Table 2. Each
row in the table corresponds to a protocol state and the moves available to O1 and R1 at
that state, such that the implication conditions of assume-guarantee synthesis are satisfied
in all resulting traces. For example, in the row corresponding to 〈m1〉, we have two move
choices for O1, one that selects ι and the other that selects a
O
1 ; O1 can choose to wait for
R to send m2 or choose a
O
1 . A similar interpretation is attached to the moves of R1. We
have P∗  P1  P
∗. As P1 satisfies bounded idle time and the AGS constraints on the
TTP, P1 ∈ P and hence, by Lemma 2, P1 ∈ PAGS . The refinement P1, while attack-free,
is not a fair non-repudiation protocol as it does not enable an exchange of non-repudiation
evidences. The protocol always ends up aborted as aO1 is the only move that satisfies ϕO for
Delivered message sequences Moves for O3 and R3
Choices for O3 Choices for R3
〈〉 m1 m1 ι ι ι
〈m1〉 ι ι m2 r
R
1 either m2 or r
R
1
〈m1,m2〉 m3 r
O
1 ι r
R
1 either ι or r
R
1
〈m1,m2,m3〉 ι r
O
1 ι m4 r
R
1
Table 3: The moves that satisfy the objectives of assume-guarantee synthesis for O3 and R3
are shown in this table at relevant protocol states represented by message sequences, when
the agents have no ability to abort the protocol.
O in state {M1,EOO} against all behaviors of R and the TTP; once O1 sends her signature
in m3, there is no move available to O1 such that satisfaction of ϕR ∧ ϕTTP is guaranteed
to satisfy ϕO, as R may decide to stop participating in the protocol.
Analysis of the refinement P2. In this case, R has no ability to resolve the protocol. It
is easy to verify that P∗  P2  P
∗. Therefore, P2 ∈ P and hence, by Lemma 2, P2 ∈ PAGS .
This protocol is a fair non-repudiation protocol that satisfies fairness, balance and timeliness.
If O does not send m3, then R2 has no choice of moves. But since P2 satisfies bounded idle
time, O2 will eventually either abort or resolve the protocol. As TTP2 satisfies the AGS
constraints on the TTP, either both agents get abort tokens or they get their respective
non-repudiation evidences eventually.
Analysis of the refinement P3. Since O has no ability to abort the protocol, while both
agents have the ability to resolve it, the predicates AO and AR are always false. The agent
and TTP objectives then reduce to,
ϕO = ✸M1 ∧ ✷(✸EOR
R
k ∨✸EOR
TTP
k ),
ϕR = ✷(EOO⇒ (✸EOO
O
k ∨✸EOO
TTP
k )),
ϕTTP = ✷(RES⇒ (✸EOO
TTP
k ∨✸EOR
TTP
k )) ∧ ✷(EOO
TTP
k ⇒ ✸EOR
TTP
k )∧
✷(EOR
TTP
k ⇒ ✸EOO
TTP
k ) .
The moves of the agents that satisfy the objectives of assume-guarantee synthesis at select
protocol valuations represented by message sequences are shown in Table 3. It is easy to
verify that as P∗ 6 P3  P
∗, P3 6∈ P and hence by Lemma 2, P3 6∈ PAGS . Since TTP3
satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP, P3 is a fair non-repudiation protocol similar to
the ZG optimistic non-repudiation protocol, but it does not satisfy timeliness [14] as O does
have the ability to abort the protocol. If message m1 is not delivered, then O has no choice
of moves to satisfy ϕO, while ϕR ∧ ϕTTP are satisfied trivially. Balance does not apply in
this case as there are no abort moves.
Analysis of the refinement P∗. In the maximal refinement P∗ = (O∗,R∗,TTP∗), since
TTP∗ satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP, if her first response to an abort or resolve
request is [x, y], she can choose any move in {ι, x, y, [x, y]} for all subsequent abort or resolve
requests. Consider a refinement PKM = (OKM ,RKM ,TTPKM )  P
∗, where OKM and
RKM correspond to O
∗ and R∗ and TTPKM  TTP
∗ such that TTPKM goes idle after
her first response to an abort or resolve request. PKM is then the KM protocol. We remark
that given the choices of moves for the TTP after her first response as suggested by assume-
guarantee synthesis, choosing ι satisfies the informal notion of efficiency. This refinement
ensures fairness, balance and timeliness.
Protocol 2: Main Protocol of our Symmetric Non-repudiation Protocol
1 O sends m1 to R;
2 if (R does not want to participate) then
3 R sends aR1 to the TTP;
4 else
5 R sends m2 to O;
6 if (R does not send m2 on time) then
7 O sends aO1 to the TTP;
8 else
9 O sends m3 to R;
10 if (O does not send m3 on time) then
11 if (R does not want to participate) then
12 R sends aR1 to the TTP;
13 else
14 R sends rR1 to the TTP;
15 else
16 R sends m4 to O;
17 if (R does not send m4 on time) then
18 O sends rO1 to the TTP;
6 A Symmetric Fair Non-Repudiation Protocol
In the KM, ASW and GJM protocols, R cannot abort the protocol. While the ability of
O to abort the protocol after sending m1 is required in the event m1 is not delivered or R
does not send m2, it can be used to abort the protocol even if all channels are resilient or
if O decides not to sign the contract after receiving m2. The protocols give O the ability to
postpone abort decisions but deny R a similar ability. While this does not violate fairness
or abuse-freeness as per prevailing definitions, it is not equitable to both agents. If R does
not want to participate in a protocol instance, then the only choice of moves for R is ι and
not m2; O will then eventually abort the protocol. Once m2 has been sent, if R decides not
to participate in the protocol and not be held responsible for signing the contract, he has
no choice of moves. If he decides to ignore m3, then O will resolve the protocol resulting in
non-repudiation evidences being issued to O, using which she can claim R is obligated by
the contract.
In this section we present a symmetric fair non-repudiation protocol that gives R the
ability to abort the protocol, assuming that the channels between the agents and the TTP
are operational. If we enhance the ability of R by including an abort move aR1 without
enhancing O and the TTP, then assume-guarantee synthesis fails. By enhancing both O and
the TTP, using assume-guarantee analysis, we design a new fair non-repudiation protocol
that (a) has no Y -attack for all Y ⊆ {O,R}; and (b) that provides R the ability to abort. In
the following, we show that if we fix the behavior of the TTP, ensuring TTP inviolability,
then the protocol is attack-free.
Consider the following refinement Ps = (Os,Rs,TTPs) with P
∗  Ps defined as follows:
MovesOs = MovesO∗ ∪ {res
O};
MovesRs = MovesR∗ ∪ {a
R
1 }; and
MovesTTPs = MovesTTP∗ ∪ {req
O}.
Protocol 3: Abort Subprotocol. X ∈ {O,R}
1 X sends aX1 to TTP;
2 if (the protocol has been aborted or resolved) then
3 TTP goes idle;
4 else
5 if (X = R) then
6 TTP sends reqO to O;
7 if (O sends resO on time) then
8 TTP marks this protocol instance as resolved in its persistent DB;
9 TTP sends [rO2 , r
R
2 ] to O and R;
10 else
11 TTP marks this protocol instance as aborted in its persistent DB;
12 TTP sends [aO2 , a
R
2 ] to O and R;
13 else
14 TTP marks this protocol instance as aborted in its persistent DB;
15 TTP sends [aO2 , a
R
2 ] to O and R;
The move reqO may be sent by TTPs only after receiving an abort request from R. The
move resO may be sent by Os only after receiving req
O. We present the main protocol and
the abort subprotocol for our symmetric fair non-repudiation protocol in Protocol 2 and
Protocol 3; the resolve subprotocol is identical to the one in the KM protocol.
To facilitate the assume-guarantee analysis of Ps, we present the following enhanced AGS
constraints on the TTP that is both necessary and sufficient to ensure TTP inviolability
(neither agent can violate ϕTTP):
1. Abort constraint. If the first request received by the TTP is aO1 , then her response to
that request should be [aO2 , a
R
2 ]; If the first request received by the TTP is a
R
1 , then her
response to that request should be reqO;
2. Resolve constraint. If the first request received by the TTP is a resolve request, then
her response to that request should be [rO2 , r
R
2 ]; If the TTP receives res
O in response to
reqO within bounded idle time, then her response should be [rO2 , r
R
2 ], otherwise it should
be [aO2 , a
R
2 ].
3. Accountability constraint. If the first response from the TTP is [x, y] or the first response
from the TTP is reqO and the next response is [x, y], then for all subsequent abort or
resolve requests her response should be in the set {ι, x, y, [x, y]}.
The enhanced AGS constraints on the TTP are required both to satisfy the implication
condition (ϕO ∧ ϕR) ⇒ ϕTTP and the condition for weak co-synthesis, (ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP).
Since TTPs waits for a bounded number of turns before sending abort tokens to both agents
after sending reqO, we require that (a) the channels between the agents and the TTP are
operational, and (b) the time taken to deliver messages reqO and resO be subsumed by
the bound on idle time chosen by the TTP between sending reqO and abort tokens. As
there is no bound on the time taken to deliver messages on resilient channels, the above
AGS constraints on the TTP cannot be enforced without operational channels. Consider a
partial trace that ends in protocol state {M1,EOO,M2,EOR,M3}; messages m1 and m2
have been received and m3 has been sent. If R now aborts the protocol and the TTP sends
reqO to O, then resilient channels can delay delivering either reqO or resO sufficiently for
the TTP to abort the protocol. In this case if m3 is eventually delivered, ϕO is violated
whereas ϕR ∧ ϕTTP is satisfied.
In the following lemma we show that in Ps, O cannot violate ϕR while satisfying ϕO, R
cannot violate ϕO while satisfying ϕR and O and R cannot violate ϕTTP while satisfying
their objectives. That is, in the refinement Ps we have [[O ‖ R ‖ TTPs ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ϕR)⇒
ϕTTP, and [[O ‖ Rs ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP) ⇒ ϕR. However, it is not the case that
[[Os ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP) ⇒ ϕO. But if the TTP is fixed then the implication
condition holds, i.e., [[Os ‖ R ‖ TTPs ‖ Sc]] ⊆ ϕR ⇒ ϕO ⊆ (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP) ⇒ ϕO. It follows
that under the assumption that the TTP does not change her behavior, while satisfying her
objective, the symmetric protocol is attack-free. We present the following lemma and prove
it in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 For the refinement Ps = (Os,Rs,TTPs), if the channels between the agents
and the TTP are operational, then there exists no Y -attack for all Y ⊆ {O,R}.
The assumption that the bound on idle time of the TTP between sending reqO and
abort tokens subsume the time taken for the delivery of messages reqO and resO can easily
be enforced before the beginning of a protocol; O agrees to participate in the protocol with
a given TTP, only if the bound chosen by the TTP is satisfactory. We point out that in
state {EOO,M2}, if R sends an abort request, he still needs O’s co-operation to abort the
protocol. Since she has m2, she can launch recovery if she so desires by composing res
O
when she receives reqO. But this is identical to the ability of O in aborting the protocol
after she sends m1. R can resolve the protocol as soon as he receives m1 and thus hold O as
a signatory to the contract even if she decided to abort the protocol after sending m1. The
protocol is therefore symmetrical to both O and R. In addition, we claim that this version
of the protocol provides better quality of service in terms of timeliness; O does not have to
wait after sending m1 for R to send m2, in protocol instances where R has no desire to sign
the contract. The following theorem states that if the TTP does not change her behavior,
then the refinement Ps is an attack-free fair non-repudiation protocol. The proof is in the
Appendix.
Theorem 8 (Symmetric attack-free protocol) Given the channels between the agents
and the TTP are operational and the TTP does not deviate from satisfying the enhanced
AGS constraints on the TTP, the refinement Ps = (Os,Rs,TTPs) is an attack-free fair
non-repudiation protocol.
From PAGS to Ps. We can systematically analyze refinements leading to Ps. Similar to
the case of synthesizing the KM non-repudiation protocol, we now present the steps that
explore refinements leading to Ps. We assume the TTP satisfies the AGS constraints on the
TTP and all refinements satisfy bounded idle time. The analyzed refinements are as follows:
1. P∗ = (O∗,R∗,TTP∗); the minimal refinement.
2. P1 = (O1,R1,TTP1) with
MovesO1 = MovesO∗ ∪ {ι,m3}, MovesR1 = MovesR∗ ∪ {m2,m4} and TTP1 = TTP
∗.
3. P2 = (O2,R2,TTP2) with
MovesO2 = MovesO1 ∪ {r
O
1 }, MovesR2 = MovesR1 and TTP2 = TTP
∗.
4. P3 = (O3,R3,TTP3) with
MovesO3 = MovesO2 \ {a
O
1 }, MovesR3 = MovesR1 ∪ {r
R
1 } and TTP3 = TTP
∗.
5. P∗ = (O∗,R∗,TTP∗); the maximal refinement.
6. Ps = (Os,Rs,TTPs) with
MovesOs = MovesO∗ ∪ {res
O}, MovesRs = MovesR∗ ∪ {a
R
1 } and
MovesTTPs = MovesTTP∗ ∪ {req
O}.
Implementation. We have implemented a prototype for assume-guarantee synthesis of
fair non-repudiation protocols. Our implementation considers triples of refinements O′  O,
R′  R, and TTP′  TTP and then explores all possible message sequences given these
participant refinements. We implemented a scheduler that backtracks and systematically
schedules all participants at all protocol states. Using the scheduler, given a subset of par-
ticipant refinements, with all other participants being most general, the implementation
explores all possible traces and checks if each trace satisfies the required AGS conditions.
Note that in checking the satisfaction of the AGS conditions, for the implication conditions
we need to consider the most general participants against each of the refinements O′, R′ and
TTP′. The checking of the implication conditions is achieved by solving secure equilibrium
on graph games with lexicographic objectives. Our implementation generates all possible
AGS solutions. The analysis of the AGS solutions generated by our implementation was
key in obtaining the symmetric protocol; using a procedure similar to obtaining PKM from
PAGS .
7 Conclusion
In this work we introduce and demonstrate the effectiveness of assume-guarantee synthesis
in synthesizing fair exchange protocols. Our main goal is to introduce a general assume-
guarantee synthesis framework that can be used with a variety of objectives; we considered
a TTP objective that treats the agents symmetrically, but the framework can be used with
possibly weaker TTP objectives that treat agents asymmetrically. Using assume-guarantee
analysis we have obtained a new symmetric protocol that is attack-free, given the channels
to the TTP are operational. While the need for operational channels may be considered
impractical, we remark that it is this flexible framework that could automatically generate
such protocols of theoretical interest in the first place. For future work we will study the
application of assume-guarantee synthesis to other security protocols.
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8 Appendix
Translating protocol models to process models. We now present a translation from
the protocol model introduced in Section 2 to the process model introduced in Section 4.
We take Moves =M, as the set of process moves, corresponding to the set of all messages
in M. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we map each participant Ai−1 to a process Pi as follows:
– Xi = Vi−1 ∪ {Li}, is the set of variables of process Pi that includes all participant
variables Vi−1 and a special variable Li corresponding to control points, taking finitely
many values in N,
– for all valuations f ∈ Fi[Xi], we have Γi(f) = Λi−1(f ↓ Vi−1) and
– δi : Fi[{Li}]×Fi[Xi \ {Li}]×Moves 7→ Fi[{Li}]×Fi[Xi \ {Li}] is the process transition
function that exactly corresponds to the participant transition function Λi−1.
The sets Xi form a partition of X =
⋃n
i=1 Xi. The set of processes Pi, given all possible
behaviors of a fair scheduler Sc, corresponds to the most general exchange program. The
realization of a protocol corresponds to a refinement P ′i  Pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where each
participant A′i−1 maps to the process P
′
i as follows:
– X ′i = Xi = Vi−1 ∪ {Li} is the set of variables of process P
′
i ,
– for all valuations f ∈ F ′i [X
′
i], we have Γ
′
i (f) = Λ
′
i−1(f ↓ Vi−1) and
– for all valuations f ∈ F ′i [X
′
i], for all moves m ∈ Moves , we have δ
′
i(f,m) =
Λ′i−1(f(Li), f ↓ Vi−1,m).
A protocol instance (protocol run) is a trace in [[P ′1 ‖ P
′
2 . . . ‖ P
′
n ‖ Sc]](v0) for an initial
valuation v0 ∈ F [X ]. The specifications of the participants, which were defined as a set of
desired sequences of messages, are subsets of traces in [[P ′1 ‖ P
′
2 . . . ‖ P
′
n ‖ Sc]](v0). Given
specifications ϕi for process Pi, a Y -attack for Y ⊆ {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} satisfies ϕi for all
Pi ∈ Y , while violating ϕj for at least one process P ′j ∈ ({P1, P2, . . . , Pn} \ Y )
′. There
are three participants in a two party fair non-repudiation protocol, the originator O, the
recipient R and the trusted third party TTP. We therefore take n = 3 in modeling two
party fair exchange protocols in the above translation.
We now prove Lemma 2. Given a refinement P ′ = (O′,R′,TTP′)  P , we first charac-
terize the smallest restriction on O′ and R′ that satisfy the implication conditions:
[[O ‖ R′ ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR; and (7)
[[O′ ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO . (8)
We show that for all refinements R′  R, the implication condition (7) holds. In order to
characterize the smallest restrictions on O that satisfies the implication condition (8), we
recall the following constraints on O. We show that these constraints are both necessary and
sufficient to satisfy (8).
AGS constraints on O. We say that a refinement O′  O satisfies the AGS constraints
on O if O′ satisfies the following constraints:
1. aO1 6∈ ΓO′(v0);
2. EOOOk 6∈ ΓO′({M1,EOR,ABR
O}); and
3. aO1 6∈ ΓO′({M1,EOR,M3}).
The most flexible refinements O′  O and R′  R. We now characterize the most
flexible refinements O′  O and R′  R that satisfy the implication conditions (ϕR ∧
ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO and (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR.
Lemma 4 For all refinements R′  R, the following assertion holds:
[[O ‖ R′ ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR.
Proof Consider an arbitrary refinement R′  R. We have the following cases of sets of traces
of [[O ‖ R′ ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] for the proof:
– Case 1. Set of traces where m3 has been received. For all traces where m3 has been
received, ϕR is satisfied. Therefore all these traces satisfy the implication condition,
(ϕO ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR.
– Case 2. Set of traces where m3 has not been received. For all traces where m3 has not
been received, the traces where either ϕO or ϕTTP is violated, satisfy the implication
condition (ϕO ∧ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR trivially. The interesting case are those traces that satisfy
ϕO ∧ ϕTTP but violate ϕR. These are exactly the traces where O does not have EOR
R
k ,
since m4 is not sent before receiving m3, and R does not have EOO
O
k , as otherwise ϕR
would be satisfied. We have following cases that lead to a contradiction:
• Case (a). O aborts the protocol. In these traces, since ϕTTP is satisfied, the abort
token must have been sent to both agents, and since neither agent will be sent the
other’s signature and the channels between the agents and the TTP are resilient,
the traces satisfy ϕR, leading to a contradiction.
• Case (b). O or R′ resolve the protocol. In these traces, since ϕTTP is true, the TTP
sends EOOTTPk to R and EOR
TTP
k to O and never sends either AO or AR. This
implies, given the channel between the agents and the TTP is resilient, the traces
satisfy ϕR, leading to a contradiction.
• Case (c). R′ chooses move ι. In these traces, since ϕO is true, either O aborts
the protocol after sending m1 or she chooses to abort or resolve the protocol after
receiving m2. In either case, given the traces satisfy ϕTTP, by the above argument
ϕR is satisfied as well, irrespective of the behavior of the channel between O and R.
This again leads to a contradiction.
Since we have shown that for all traces, either ϕR is satisfied or satisfaction of ϕO ∧ ϕTTP
implies satisfaction of ϕR, we conclude that for all refinements R
′  R the assertion holds.

It follows from Lemma 4, that as R′ can always resolve the protocol in state {EOO}
and all successor states, such that the resulting trace satisfies (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR, we have
m2 ∈ ΓR′({EOO}). Similarly, m4 ∈ ΓR′({EOO,M2,EOO
O
k }) as ϕR is satisfied in all traces
where m3 has been received, thus satisfying (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR.
In the following lemma, in assertion 1 we show that for all refinements O′  O that
satisfy the AGS constraints on O, the implication condition (8) is satisfied; in assertion 2
we show that if O′ does not satisfy the AGS constraints on O, the implication condition (8)
is violated.
Lemma 5 (The smallest restriction on O′  O) For all refinements O′  O, the
following assertions hold:
1. if O′ satisfies the AGS constraints on O, then
[[O′ ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO.
2. if O′ does not satisfy the AGS constraints on O, then
[[O′ ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO.
Proof Consider an arbitrary refinement O′  O that satisfies the AGS constraints on O. We
have the following cases of sets of traces of [[O′ ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] for the proof:
– Case 1. Set of traces where m4 has been received. In the case of classical co-synthesis,
an adversarial R will never send m4 as that satisfies ϕO unconditionally, but in assume-
guarantee synthesis, from Lemma 4, since all refinements of R satisfy the weaker condi-
tion of (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR, m4 ∈ ΓR′(〈EOO,M2,EOO
O
k 〉). For all traces where m4 has
been received, ϕO is satisfied. Therefore all these traces satisfy the implication condition
(ϕR ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO.
– Case 2. Set of traces where m4 has not been received. For all traces where m4 has not
been received, the traces where either ϕR or ϕTTP is violated, satisfy the implication
condition (ϕR ∧ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO trivially. The interesting case are those traces that satisfy
ϕR ∧ ϕTTP but violate ϕO. These are exactly the traces where O does not have EOR
R
k ,
since m4 has not been received. We have the following cases that lead to a contradiction:
• Case (a). O′ has sent m3. In these traces, since O
′ satisfies the AGS constraints on
O, the only choice of moves for O′ are ι or rO1 ; she can wait for R to send m4 or
resolve the protocol. In the set of traces where she eventually receivesm4, by Case 1,
the traces satisfy (ϕR ∧ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO. If she does not receive m4, she will eventually
resolve the protocol to satisfy ϕO. In the set of traces where she eventually resolves
the protocol, since ϕTTP is satisfied, and R cannot abort the protocol, the TTP will
eventually respond to her request by sending her non-repudiation evidence and not
the abort token. These traces therefore satisfy ϕO, leading to a contradiction.
• Case (b). O′ aborts the protocol before sending m3. Since O
′ satisfies the AGS con-
straints on O, she cannot abort the protocol in the initial state v0. Therefore, O
′
must have started the protocol by sending m1. In all these traces, O
′ aborts the
protocol after sending m1 but before sending m3 and since O
′ satisfies the AGS
constraints on O, she will not send m3 after sending the abort request. Since these
traces satisfy ϕTTP, the abort token must have been sent to both agents, and since
neither agent will be sent the other’s signature and the channels between the agents
and the TTP are resilient, the traces satisfy ϕO, leading to a contradiction.
• Case (c). O′ resolves the protocol before sending m3. In these traces, since ϕTTP is
true, the TTP sends EORTTPk to O and EOO
TTP
k to R and never sends either AO
or AR. This implies, given the channel between the agents and the TTP is resilient,
the traces satisfy ϕO, leading to a contradiction.
• Case (d). O′ chooses move ι instead of sending m3. In these traces, since ϕR is true,
R must have resolved the protocol after receiving m1. In this case, given the traces
satisfy ϕTTP, by the above argument ϕO is satisfied as well. This again leads to a
contradiction.
• Case (e). The channel between O and R is unreliable. If either m1 or m2 are not
delivered, then O′ can abort the protocol. If either m3 or m4 are not delivered, then
O′ can resolve the protocol. In either case, by Case (a), Case (b) and Case (c), we
have ϕO is satisfied even when the channel between O and R is unreliable, leading
to a contradiction.
We conclude that for all O′ that satisfy the AGS constraints on O, we have [[O′ ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖
Sc]] ⊆ (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO.
For assertion 2, consider an arbitrary refinement O′  O that does not satisfy the AGS
constraints on O. We consider violation of the constraints on a case by case basis. For each
case we produce a witness trace that violates the implication condition (ϕR ∧ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO.
We proceed as follows:
– Case 1. aO1 ∈ ΓO′(v0). In a trace where O
′ sends an abort request before sending message
m1 in the initial protocol state v0, it is trivially the case that the trace does not satisfy ϕO
but satisfies ϕR. If the TTP satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP and sends [a
O
2 , a
R
2 ]
in response, then the trace satisfies ϕTTP. Therefore, the trace violates (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP)⇒
ϕO.
– Case 2. EOOOk ∈ ΓO′(M1,EOO,ABR
O). To produce a witness trace we consider a partial
trace that ends in protocol state {M1,EOO,ABR
O}; messages m1 and m2 have been
received and aO1 has been sent. Since the channel between O and the TTP is resilient,
the abort request is eventually processed by the TTP. If O′ sends message m3 in this
state and the TTP responds with move [aO2 , a
R
2 ] to her abort request, then there exists
a behavior of the channel between O and R such that m3 is eventually delivered and
the protocol is aborted. The trace therefore satisfies ϕR ∧ ϕTTP but violates ϕO; as O
cannot get R’s signature after the protocol is aborted and R has her signature.
– Case 3. aO1 ∈ ΓO′(M1,EOO,M3). To produce a witness trace we consider a partial trace
that ends in protocol state {M1,EOO,M3}; messages m1 and m2 have been received
and m3 has been sent. If O
′ aborts the protocol in this state and the TTP satisfies
the AGS constraints on the TTP and responds with move [aO2 , a
R
2 ], then there exists a
behavior of the channel between O and R, where m3 is eventually delivered to R. The
trace satisfies ϕR ∧ ϕTTP but violates ϕO.
We conclude that if O′ does not satisfy the AGS constraints on O, then [[O′ ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖
Sc]] 6⊆ (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO. 
From Lemma 5, it is both necessary and sufficient that O satisfies the AGS constraints
on O to ensure the implication condition (8).
The maximal refinement P∗ = (O∗,R∗,TTP∗).We recall the definition of the maximal
refinement P∗ = (O∗,R∗,TTP∗) below:
1. O∗  O satisfies the AGS constraints on O and for all O′ that satisfy the constraints,
we have O′  O∗;
2. R∗ = R; and
3. TTP∗  TTP satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP and for all TTP′ that satisfy
the constraints, we have TTP′  TTP∗.
The weak co-synthesis requirement. Let b ∈ N be a bound on the number of times that
O or the TTP may choose the idle move ι when scheduled by Sc. In the following lemma,
for all refinements P ′  P∗ that satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, in assertion 1 we
show that if b is finite, then the condition for weak co-synthesis is satisfied; in assertion 2
we show that if b is unbounded, then the condition for weak co-synthesis is violated.
Lemma 6 (Bounded idle time lemma) For all refinements P ′ = (O′,R′,TTP′)  P∗
that satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, for all b ∈ N with O′ and TTP′ choosing at
most b idle moves when scheduled by Sc, the following assertions hold:
1. if b is finite, then [[O′ ‖ R′ ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP).
2. if b is unbounded, then [[O′ ‖ R′ ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP).
Proof For the first assertion, we show that the condition for weak co-synthesis holds against
all possible behaviors of the channel between O and R. We have the following cases:
– Case 1. Agents abort or resolve the protocol. In all traces where the agents abort or
resolve the protocol, given b is finite and that TTP′ satisfies the AGS constraints on
the TTP, by Lemma 1 (assertion 1), TTP′ will eventually respond to the first and all
subsequent requests such that ϕTTP is satisfied. In all these traces, given the channels
between the agents and the TTP are resilient, both agents get either the abort token or
non-repudiation evidences but never both. This ensures ϕO and ϕR are satisfied.
– Case 2. The channel between O and R is resilient. In all traces where neither agent aborts
nor resolves the protocol, ϕTTP is satisfied trivially. Further, the only refinements of the
agents that neither abort nor resolve the protocol are those where {m1,m3} ∈ MovesO′
and {m2,m4} ∈ MovesR′ . Since b is finite, the only choice of moves for O
′, since she
does not abort or resolve the protocol, are m1 in state v0 and m3 in state {M1,EOR},
after choosing at most b idle moves at each state. Similarly, the only choice of moves
for R′ are ι or m2 in state {EOO} and ι or m4 in state {EOO,M2,EOO
O
k }. If R
′ never
sendsm2, then O
′ will eventually abort the protocol after bounded idle time and this case
reduces to Case 1. If R′ never sends m4, then O
′ will eventually resolve the protocol after
bounded idle time and this case reduces to Case 1. If R′ sends m2 and m4 eventually,
since the channel between O and R is assumed resilient, messages m1, m2, m3 and m4
are eventually delivered satisfying ϕO and ϕR.
– Case 3. The channel between O and R is unreliable. Since O′  O∗, we have aO1 6∈ ΓO′(v0)
and aO1 6∈ ΓO′({M1,EOR,M3}); O
′ can abort the protocol in all other states. Therefore,
O′ satisfies the AGS constraints on O. Since b is finite and O′ cannot resolve the protocol
before initiating it, the only choice of moves for O′ in state v0 is to send m1 eventually.
If the channel between O and R does not deliver either messages m1 or m2, the only
choice of moves for O′ is to abort the protocol. If either messages m3 or m4 are not
delivered, then the only choice of moves for O′ is to resolve the protocol. In both these
cases, since O′ chooses to abort or resolve the protocol, by Case 1 the result follows.
We conclude that irrespective of the behavior of the channel between O and R, if b is finite,
we have [[O′ ‖ R′ ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP).
For the second assertion, given an unbounded b, to show that weak co-synthesis fails, it
suffices to show that there exists a behavior of the agents, the TTP and the channels that
violates the condition for weak co-synthesis. Consider a partial trace ending in protocol state
{M1,EOO,M2,EOR,M3,EOO
O
k ,RES
O}; messages m1, m2 and m3 have been received, R
′
chooses to go idle, never sending m4 and O
′ has sent rO1 . Since b is unbounded, if TTP
′
chooses to remain idle forever, then ϕO and ϕTTP are violated leading to a violation of
(ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP). Therefore, given an unbounded b, we have [[O
∗ ‖ R∗ ‖ TTP∗ ‖ Sc]] 6⊆
(ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP). 
From Lemma 6, it is both necessary and sufficient that the refinements P ′  P∗ that
satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP, also satisfy bounded idle time to ensure weak co-
synthesis. While O and the TTP should satisfy bounded idle time, there are no restrictions
on R. Using Lemma 1, Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 we now present a proof of Lemma 2.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2). In one direction, consider an arbitrary refinement P ′ =
(O′,R′,TTP′) ∈ P. We show that the conditions of assume-guarantee synthesis are satisfied
as follows:
– The implication condition for O. Since P ′  P∗, we have O′  O∗, R′  R∗ and
TTP′  TTP∗. As aO1 6∈ ΓO∗(v0) and a
O
1 6∈ ΓO∗(M1,EOR,M3), the refinement P
′
satisfies the AGS constraints on O. Therefore, by Lemma 5 (assertion 1), we have [[O′ ‖
R ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO.
– The implication condition for R. By Lemma 4, we have [[O ‖ R′ ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧
ϕTTP)⇒ ϕR.
– The implication condition for the TTP. Since TTP′  TTP∗ and TTP′ satisfies the
AGS constraints on the TTP, by Lemma 1 (assertion 1), ϕTTP is satisfied irrespective
of the behavior of O and R, which implies [[O ‖ R ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR)⇒ ϕTTP.
– The weak co-synthesis condition. Given P ′ satisfies bounded idle time, by Lemma 6 we
have [[O′ ‖ R′ ‖ TTP′ ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP); weak co-synthesis holds.
Since we have shown that the refinement P ′ satisfies all the implication conditions and
the weak co-synthesis condition of assume-guarantee synthesis, we have P ′ ∈ PAGS . Hence
P ⊆ PAGS .
In the other direction, consider an arbitrary refinement P ′′ = (O′′,R′′,TTP′′) ∈ PAGS .
We show that P ′′ ∈ P as follows:
– The AGS constraints on O. By Lemma 5, since it is both necessary and sufficient that a
refinement satisfy the AGS constraints on O to ensure the implication condition (ϕR ∧
ϕTTP) ⇒ ϕO is satisfied, given the implication condition holds, we conclude that P
′′
satisfies the AGS constraints on O. Therefore, O′′  O∗.
– The AGS constraints on the TTP. By Lemma 1, since it is both necessary and sufficient
that a refinement satisfy the AGS constraints on the TTP to ensure the implication
condition (ϕO ∧ ϕR) ⇒ ϕTTP is satisfied, given the implication condition holds, we
conclude that P ′′ satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP and TTP′′  TTP∗.
– The bounded idle time condition. By Lemma 6, since it is both necessary and sufficient
that a refinement satisfy bounded idle time to ensure weak co-synthesis, since weak
co-synthesis holds in this case, we conclude that P ′′ satisfies bounded idle time.
– P ′′  P∗. Since we have shown that O′′  O∗ and TTP′′  TTP∗, we have P ′′  P∗.
– P∗  P ′′. Since P∗ is the smallest refinement in the set PAGS , given P ′′ ∈ PAGS , it must
be the case that P∗  P ′′.
For P ′′ ∈ PAGS , as we have shown that P∗  P ′′  P
∗, P ′′ satisfies the AGS constraints on
the TTP and satisfies bounded idle time. Thus we have P ′′ ∈ P and hence PAGS ⊆ P. The
result follows. 
We now present a proof of Lemma 3. We recall the enhanced AGS constraints on the
TTP below:
1. Abort constraint. If the first request received by the TTP is aO1 , then her response to
that request should be [aO2 , a
R
2 ]; If the first request received by the TTP is a
R
1 , then her
response to that request should be reqO;
2. Resolve constraint. If the first request received by the TTP is a resolve request, then
her response to that request should be [rO2 , r
R
2 ]; If the TTP receives res
O in response to
reqO within bounded idle time, then her response should be [rO2 , r
R
2 ], otherwise it should
be [aO2 , a
R
2 ].
3. Accountability constraint. If the first response from the TTP is [x, y] or the first response
from the TTP is reqO and the next response is [x, y], then for all subsequent abort or
resolve requests her response should be in the set {ι, x, y, [x, y]}.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 3). From Protocol 2, since the refinement Os does not abort the
protocol either in the initial state v0 or after sending message m3, we have Os satisfies the
AGS constraints on O. By our definition of the behavior of TTPs, we have TTPs satisfies
the enhanced AGS constraints on the TTP. From the definition of the main protocol in
Protocol 2 and the abort subprotocol in Protocol 3, since the resolve subprotocol is identical
to the KM protocol, we have Os and TTPs satisfy the bounded idle time requirement. We
take A = {O,R,TTP} and show that there is no Y -attack for Y ⊆ {O,R} through the
following cases:
– Case 1. |Y | = 2. In this case Y = {O,R}. We show that [[O ‖ R ‖ TTPs ‖ Sc]] ⊆ ϕTTP.
For all traces in [[O ‖ R ‖ TTPs ‖ Sc]] where R does not abort the protocol, since TTPs
satisfies the enhanced AGS constraints on the TTP, by Lemma 1 (assertion 1), ϕTTP
is satisfied. For all traces where R sends an abort request, the TTP sends reqO. If O
responds with resO within bounded idle time, then the TTP resolves the protocol for
both O and R such that the AGS constraints on the TTP are satisfied. If O does not
send resO within bounded idle time, then the TTP aborts the protocol, such that the
AGS constraints on the TTP are satisfied. For all subsequent abort requests from R,
the TTP response satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP. All traces therefore satisfy
ϕTTP. Hence, there is no Y -attack in this case.
– Case 2. |Y | = 1. In this case, either Y = {O} or Y = {R}. We have the following cases
towards the proof:
• Case (a). Y = {O}. We show that [[O ‖ Rs ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP) ⇒ ϕR; it
will follow that [[O ‖ Rs ‖ TTPs ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕTTP) ⇒ ϕR. Consider the set of
traces in [[O ‖ Rs ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]]. For all traces where R does not abort the protocol, by
Lemma 4, we have ϕO∧ϕTTP ⇒ ϕR. For all traces where R aborts the protocol, if he
has received m3, then ϕR is satisfied. For all traces where R aborts the protocol and
message m3 has not been received, if ϕTTP is violated, then the implication holds
and if ϕTTP is satisfied, then either both agents get abort tokens or their respective
non-repudiation evidences, thus satisfying ϕR. We have shown that all traces satisfy
the implication condition ϕO∧ϕTTP ⇒ ϕR. Since we have a fixed TTP that satisfies
the AGS constraints on the TTP, we have ϕTTP is satisfied in all traces by Case
1. As ϕO is satisfied by assumption, we conclude ϕR is satisfied as well. Therefore,
there is no Y -attack in this case.
• Case (b). Y = {R}. It can be shown that [[Os ‖ R ‖ TTP ‖ Sc]] 6⊆ (ϕR∧ϕTTP)⇒ ϕO.
We show that, by fixing the TTP, we have [[Os ‖ R ‖ TTPs ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕR ∧ϕTTP)⇒
ϕO. Consider the set of traces [[Os ‖ R ‖ TTPs ‖ Sc]]. For all traces where R does
not abort the protocol, since O satisfies the AGS constraints on O, by Lemma 5,
we have (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP) ⇒ ϕO. If R aborts the protocol, since the TTP satisfies the
enhanced AGS constraints on the TTP, and the channel between O and the TTP
is operational, reqO must have been received by O. At this stage, if Os has sent
message m3, then the only choice of moves for Os to satisfy ϕO is res
O; a request
to resolve the protocol. Since the channels are operational, there exists a bound on
the idle time of the TTP such that both reqO and resO can be delivered within
this bound. Moreover, as TTPs satisfies the enhanced AGS constraints on the TTP,
both O and R will be issued non-repudiation evidences and never abort tokens, thus
satisfying ϕO. If Os has not sent message m3, then the only choice of moves for Os
to satisfy ϕO are ι or res
O. In all these traces, since TTPs satisfies bounded idle
time and the AGS constraints on the TTP, either both agents get non-repudiation
evidences or abort tokens but never both, thus satisfying ϕO. Therefore, all these
traces satisfy (ϕR ∧ ϕTTP) ⇒ ϕO, which given ϕR is satisfied by assumption and
ϕTTP is satisfied by Case 1, implies ϕO is satisfied as well. There is no Y -attack in
this case.
– Case 2. |Y | = 0. In this case Y = ∅ and (A \ Y )′ = {Os,Rs,TTPs}. Since Ps satisfies
bounded idle time, in all traces where R does not abort the protocol, by Lemma 6, the
condition for weak co-synthesis is satisfied. In all traces where R aborts the protocol, as
TTPs satisfies the AGS constraints on the TTP, she sends req
O. In all these traces, since
TTPs and Os satisfy bounded idle time, and the channels are operational, Os chooses ι
or sends resO and TTPs responds with either abort tokens or non-repudiation evidences
but not both, leading to the satisfaction of ϕO and ϕR. Since ϕTTP is satisfied by Case
1, all these traces satisfy (ϕO ∧ϕR ∧ϕTTP). Therefore, there is no Y -attack in this case.
The result follows. 
Proof (Proof of Theorem 8). By Lemma 3, it follows that if the TTP does not change
her behavior, then Ps is attack-free. Further, by the weak co-synthesis condition, we have
[[Os ‖ Rs ‖ TTPs ‖ Sc]] ⊆ (ϕO ∧ ϕR ∧ ϕTTP) and hence by Theorem 1, we have [[Os ‖ Rs ‖
TTPs ‖ Sc]] ⊆ ϕf . Thus Ps satisfies fairness. Using PCS we ensure abuse-freeness. Since
[[Os ‖ Rs ‖ TTPs ‖ Sc]] ∩ (✸NRO ∧ ✸NRR) 6= ∅, the refinement Ps enables an exchange of
signatures and hence is an exchange protocol. We conclude that if the TTP does not change
her behavior, then Ps is an attack-free fair non-repudiation protocol. 
